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Several recent studies have shown that plaintiffs bringing employment 
discrimination lawsuits in federal court under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) win only approximately five percent of their cases.  
This Article argues that this phenomenon is attributable, at least in part, to 
the ADA’s flawed definition of the term “disability.”  It suggests abandoning 
the current definition and adopting a new approach, one that would reshape 
the ADA’s protected class so that it more closely resembles a discrete and insular 
minority, such as those traditionally protected by the civil rights laws.  While 
Title I of the ADA embraces the goals of participatory and distributive justice 
for all individuals with disabilities, these objectives should be subordinated to 
the goal of providing corrective justice for those who commonly suffer 
discrimination.  “Individuals with disabilities” should be redefined to mean 
those with mental or physical impairments that have been targeted for 
systematic discrimination by public policy or widespread  private practice.  The 
ADA should further authorize the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) to develop an exclusive list of covered impairments and 
categories of conditions that are known to be associated with discrimination, 
such as mental illness, disfigurement, and paralysis.  The proposed definition 
and the list of covered categories would provide much clearer guidance to 
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plaintiffs, employers, and the courts, and would significantly enhance the 
efficacy of Title I of the ADA. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Commission on 
Mental and Physical Disability Law published a study on Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,1 which prohibits employment 
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities.2  The 
study revealed that employers prevailed in 95.7% of the final Title I 
case decisions—meaning cases that have gone through the appeals 
process, if any, or were not yet changed on appeal as of April 2002.3  
Professor Ruth Colker published a similar study in 1999 concluding 
that defendants prevailed in 94% of cases at the federal district court 
level and in 84% of cases in which losing plaintiffs appealed their 
judgments.4 
Another scholar, Louis S. Rulli, published a study of all reported 
ADA cases litigated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during 
1996, 1997, and 1998.5  Much like the other researchers, Rulli found 
that employers prevailed in 94.2% of Title I cases, experiencing their 
highest win rate in 1998.6  He noted that “[p]laintiffs stumbled most 
often by not being able to satisfy the definition of disability, despite 
clearly possessing physical or mental impairments.”7 
                                                          
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). 
 2. Id. § 12112(a). 
 3. Amy L. Allbright, 2001 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey 
Update, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 394, 394-98 (2002).  Prior ABA 
surveys, conducted for the years 1992-2000, revealed similarly high employer win 
rates.  Id.  According to the ABA, in the years 1992 through 1997, plaintiffs lost 
91.6% of the 1,200 cases litigated.  See id. at 397 (excluding from the database lower 
court decisions that were overruled on appeal).  Likewise, employee-plaintiffs lost 
94.4%, 95.7% and 96.4% of cases in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively.  Id. 
 4. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 108 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, A Windfall for Defendants].  
In a subsequent study, Colker analyzed appellate cases in greater detail to determine 
which factors might predict ADA appellate outcomes.  Ruth Colker, Winning and 
Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 244-78 (2001) 
[hereinafter Colker, Winning and Losing] (examining a database of 720 published 
and unpublished cases available on Westlaw and finding that employers obtained full 
reversal in 42% of the cases they appealed and had damages reduced in an 
additional 17.5% of cases, while plaintiffs who appealed pro-employer judgments 
obtained reversals in only 12% of cases). 
 5. Louis S. Rulli, Employment Discrimination Litigation Under the ADA from the 
Perspective of the Poor:  Can the Promise of Title I be Fulfilled for Low-Income Workers in the 
Next Decade?, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 345, 365-66 (2000). 
 6. Id. at 366.  The author notes that defendants were slightly less successful in 
Title II and Title III cases, prevailing in 91.7% and 85.7% of cases, respectively.  Id. at 
n.149. 
 7. Id. 
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By contrast, Professor Colker found that plaintiffs litigating cases 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”)8 obtained 
reversals in 34% of the cases they appealed, a much higher rate than 
the 12% pro-plaintiff reversal rate under the ADA.9  A study of sexual 
harassment cases concluded that plaintiffs won 54.1% of cases 
decided on pretrial motions, 45.7% of bench trials, and 54.6% of jury 
trials.10  At the appellate level, both plaintiffs and defendants who 
appealed won 27% of the cases.11  A study of Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (“ADEA”)12 litigation revealed that overall, 
defendants won only 25.8% of cases and plaintiffs prevailed in 8.7% 
of cases, while approximately 58% of cases were resolved through 
settlement.13  Thus, ADEA plaintiffs obtained favorable decisions in 
over 20% of cases that did not settle.14 
In a well-known article entitled The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation,15 George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein argue that cases 
which are fully litigated rather than resolved through settlement are 
commonly close cases that are difficult to decide.16  They explain that 
“[w]here either the plaintiff or defendant has a ‘powerful’ case, 
settlement is more likely because the parties are less likely to disagree 
about the outcome.”17  Because most adjudicated disputes are close 
cases, the plaintiff win rate in court should approach fifty percent.18  
                                                          
 8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (prohibiting employment 
discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, and gender). 
 9. Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 248 & 253. 
 10. Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 570 (2001). 
 11. Id. at 574. 
 12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999). 
 13. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age:  The Expanding Scope of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 513 (1995). 
 14. Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 513.  See also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Double Standard on Appeal:  An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination 
Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (July 16, 2001) available at 
http://www.naacpfstf.org/double-standard.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).  The study 
finds that with respect to employment discrimination cases litigated in federal court, 
defendants win 43.61% of cases they appeal after a plaintiff’s trial victory and 44.74% 
of cases they appeal after a plaintiff’s pretrial victory.  Id.  Plaintiffs win only 5.8% of 
cases they appeal after a defendant’s trial victory and 11.03% of cases they appeal 
when a defendant has obtained a pretrial victory.  Id.  The study does not provide a 
more specific analysis relating to different categories of claims, such as race, age, and 
disability. 
 15. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 16. Id. at 17. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. (describing the statistical reasoning for why plaintiffs’ win rate should 
approach fifty percent). 
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In light of this theory, the ADA plaintiffs’ success rate of only five 
percent is all the more startling.19 
This Article provides an assessment of the efficacy of Title I of the 
ADA, with particular focus on the statute’s definition of “disability.”  
It poses several fundamental questions.  First, what are the statutory 
goals of the law? Second, are the very low plaintiff win rates indicative 
of any flaw in the ADA that requires its revision?  Finally, what 
alternatives exist for revising the ADA and which are the most 
reasonable options? 
With these fundamental questions in mind, one should consider 
the ADA’s statutory goals.  The statute purports to promote 
participatory justice20 by requiring that society reshape practices that 
exclude individuals with disabilities.21  It also purports to promote 
distributive justice22 by mandating a redistribution of resources in the 
form of reasonable accommodation to facilitate job performance for 
individuals with disabilities.23  These two goals, however, should be 
subordinated to a related, but distinct objective:  corrective justice.  
                                                          
 19. Allbright, supra note 3, at 394. 
 20. See Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 312 
(1999) (arguing that all competent adults have equal abilities to act as moral agents 
in society); Anita Silvers, Reconciling Equality to Difference:  Caring (F)or Justice for People 
with Disabilities, 10 HYPATIA 30, 47-53 (1995) (hypothesizing that exclusion of disabled 
persons is a result of lack of social and political power rather than any natural 
inferiority); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE  173 (1990) 
(defining social equality as requiring the “full participation and inclusion of 
everyone in a society’s major institutions”). 
 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000) (stating that “[t]he Nation’s proper goals 
regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full 
participation, independent living, and economic self sufficiency for such 
individuals”). 
 22. See Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination, and Priority, in AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES 18, 25-27 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) 
(describing the responsibility-catering, welfarist, and prioritarian conceptions of 
distributive justice); see also Dan Brock, Health Care Resource Prioritization and 
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 223, 232-
34 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter Brock, Health 
Care] (discussing prioritization of resource allocation to those who are worst off); 
Dan Brock, Justice and the ADA:  Does Prioritizing and Rationing Health Care Discriminate 
Against the Disabled? 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 159, 159-60 (1995) [hereinafter Brock, 
Justice and the ADA] (stating that a theory of justice’s conclusions regarding the 
distribution of benefits and burdens are dependant on the principles applied to 
them); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in EQUAL FREEDOM:  SELECTED TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 307, 327-29 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995) (arguing that 
resources should be devoted to the disabled based on a concept of “basic capability 
equality”); David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, 
DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION:  PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 147, 147 (1998) [hereinafter DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION] (noting 
that disabled individuals receive goods and services on the basis of their disability as a 
result of legislative entitlements and civil rights in the United States). 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (establishing that unlawfully 
discriminatory practices include failure to provide reasonable accommodations to 
otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities). 
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Title I of the ADA should be viewed primarily as combating existing 
discrimination against people with disabilities and providing redress 
for those who suffer systematic discrimination because of their 
physical or mental impairments.24 
This Article argues that the definition of the term “disability” is 
severely flawed and hinders the achievement of corrective justice.25  
The definition provides little guidance to litigants and to the courts 
concerning who can be deemed an individual with a disability and 
obligates courts to engage in the burdensome task of individually 
assessing each plaintiff’s functionality level.26  This process leads to 
inconsistent court decisions concerning which conditions constitute 
disabilities, to personal and invasive questions by fact-finders 
regarding plaintiffs’ daily life activities, and to an ever-narrowing 
judicial interpretation of the scope of the protected class.27  Unlike 
the groups protected by other civil rights statutes,28 individuals with 
disabilities, as currently defined, do not constitute a “discrete and 
insular minority” and are not easily identifiable as a class. 
Moreover, the ADA’s amorphous definition of disability is costly to 
both private litigants and to the public.  Plaintiffs are misled into 
filing marginal suits with little or no chance of actual success in court; 
employers must absorb the expense of defending a multitude of cases 
brought by those with questionable disability status; and the public 
must support the administrative and court costs of processing such 
litigation. 
To provide better guidance to plaintiffs, employers, and the courts, 
the ADA’s protected class should be reshaped so that it is more easily 
discernable and more like other classes that have gained civil rights 
protection because of their histories of exclusion and 
marginalization.29  This Article proposes a new categorical system for 
redefining the ADA’s protected class and bolstering the law’s 
efficacy.30  It suggests that “individuals with disabilities” be redefined 
as those with mental or physical impairments that have been targeted 
                                                          
 24. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 26. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (defining a disability as “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual”). 
 27. See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
 28. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) 
(2000) (protecting persons from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex and national origin); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1999) (protecting persons from discrimination on the basis of 
age). 
 29. See discussion infra Part III. 
 30. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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for systematic discrimination by public policy or widespread private 
practice.31  The ADA should further authorize the EEOC to develop a 
list of impairments and categories of conditions that are known to 
have been associated with discrimination, such as mental illness, 
disfigurement, and paralysis.32  The list, which would appear in the 
federal regulations, would be periodically reviewed and updated, and 
those whose conditions meet the listed criteria would be presumed 
disabled.33 
Part I of this Article analyzes the ADA’s statutory goals and its 
current definition of the term “disability.”  In addition to discussing 
the statutory text, it describes the EEOC’s interpretive guidelines and 
relevant court decisions and identifies several serious concerns raised 
by the statutory language and mandate.  Part II provides an 
assessment of empirical and other evidence concerning the efficacy 
of the ADA.  Part III evaluates a number of alternatives that could 
address the law’s shortcomings and develops specific 
recommendations for revisions of the ADA’s definition of disability.34 
I. TITLE I OF THE ADA:  ITS GOALS AND ITS PROTECTED CLASS 
A. The Statutory Goals:  Participatory Justice, Distributive Justice,  
and Corrective Justice 
Several theorists focus on disability rights, and the ADA reflects 
their philosophies.  Elizabeth Anderson, Anita Silvers, and Iris 
Marion Young argue that justice requires social inclusion and respect 
for all persons, regardless of their physical or mental limitations.35   
They also propose that to treat individuals with disabilities equally, 
society must reshape practices that are exclusionary.36 
                                                          
 31. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 32. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 33. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 34. Throughout this Article, the terms “individual with a disability” and 
“disabled” are used interchangeably because no consensus exists as to which is more 
appropriate.  British activists, for instance, use the term “disabled people,” 
emphasizing that these individuals are above all else people and are disabled only 
because society views them as such and subjects them to marginalization. American 
activists prefer the term “people with disabilities,” emphasizing that a disability does 
not change the inner person and that it constitutes only one characteristic, among 
many, of a person.  See Arneson, supra note 22, at 9-10.  Activists in both countries 
find the term “the disabled” troubling because it suggests that individuals with very 
different characteristics can be lumped together as an inferior class and thereby 
stereotyped.  Id. 
 35. Anderson, supra note 20, at 312; DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, 
supra note 22, at 47-53; YOUNG, supra note 20, at 173. 
 36. Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL 
ETHICS 300, 311-12 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003). 
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Silvers offers one mechanism for applying the participatory justice 
theory to policy decisions.  Silvers proposes that specific social 
practices be assessed using a test referred to as “historically 
counterfactualizing.”37  This test “involves asking whether a practice 
would be the same if the disabled individuals it marginalizes were the 
majority, not a powerless minority, of people.”38  If the answer is 
negative, the practice should be changed.39  To illustrate, if the 
majority of Americans were in wheelchairs, most buildings would 
have been built with ramps and elevators long before the ADA 
required these practices. 
The ADA embraces participatory justice as one of its explicit goals.  
The statute’s “Findings and Purposes” section states that “[t]he 
Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to 
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, 
and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”40  Accordingly, 
the statute mandates that employers may not exclude qualified 
individuals with disabilities from the workplace because of their 
disabilities.41 
Other theorists contend that equality of social opportunities is a 
tangential issue, and that justice requires primarily a redistribution of 
goods so that the disabled receive additional resources to compensate 
for their limitations.42  Amartya Sen, for example, emphasizes the 
need for “basic capability equality” and believes that distributive 
justice requires allocating enough resources to those with limitations 
so that they can achieve essential abilities.43  Richard Arneson believes 
that prioritization of resources should depend on two factors:  
                                                          
 37. Id. at 312. 
 38. Id. at 312-13. 
 39. Id.  Professor Silvers further elucidates her argument as follows: 
Historical counterfactualizing helps us to identify disadvantage that is the 
arbitrary artifact of social arrangements controlled by the standard of 
normality.  It facilitates distinguishing arrangements that do no more than 
conform to the dominant group’s tastes and preferences from arrangements 
that have more to recommend them.  Tastes and preferences are transitory.  
The practices they elicit need not be perpetual.  Exclusionary practices 
dominate . . . because most often they are comfortable for the majority and 
disadvantage only a minority of people.  Although the majority may be 
discomforted if restrictive practices are altered to become more inclusive, 
their social participation is not threatened by such change.  Thus, on 
balance, such social reform is less burdensome for members of the majority 
than enduring exclusion is for members of the minority.   
Id. at 313. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
 41. See id. § 12112(a). 
 42. See, e.g., Arneson, supra note 22, at 25-27; Brock, Justice and the ADA, supra note 
22, at 159-60; Brock, Health Care, supra note 22, at 232-34; Sen, supra note 22, at 327-
29; DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, supra note 22, at 147. 
 43. Sen, supra note 22, at 328. 
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(1) how badly off each person would be compared to others if no 
further resources were allocated to her; and (2) how much 
individuals will benefit from further allocations, as compared to 
others who might receive them.44 
The ADA likewise embraces the objective of distributive justice.  It 
speaks of enabling individuals with disabilities to achieve 
“independent living” and “economic self-sufficiency.”45  The law also 
requires employers to absorb the cost of providing reasonable 
accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities for purposes 
of facilitating job performance.46 
This Article argues for emphasis of a related but distinct goal:  
corrective justice.  Title I of the ADA should be viewed primarily as 
combating existing discrimination against people with particular 
impairments and providing redress for those who suffer systematic 
discrimination because of their disabilities.47  The emphasis, 
therefore, is not upon providing opportunities for anyone with 
physical or mental limitations, but upon counteracting known 
patterns of discrimination. 
This objective, too, correlates with the language of the ADA, which 
describes individuals with disabilities as “a discrete and insular 
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, 
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated 
to a position of political powerlessness in our society.”48  The goal of 
corrective justice provides a clearer conception of the ADA’s purpose 
than the other two above-mentioned goals and answers the question 
of who should benefit from the promotion of participatory and 
distributive justice.  Those individuals with limitations that are 
generally targeted for discrimination and exclusion are the most 
needy and deserving and, according to the ADA’s text, are also the 
intended statutory beneficiaries.49 Corrective justice is at the root of 
the other federal anti-discrimination statutes as well, as they are 
designed to provide remedies for those who have long suffered 
                                                          
 44. Arneson, supra note 22, at 26. 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
 46. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  Arguably, it is unfair to place this burden on 
employers because they are not responsible for causing disabilities.  Business 
advocates would likely contend that a better way to meet the goal of distributive 
justice is to place the burden on society at large through taxation and social 
programs. 
 47. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). 
 49. Id. § 12101(a)(7), (b). 
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discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, religion, 
sex, and age.50 
The goal of corrective justice is inherent in the civil rights model in 
general and the ADA in particular.  Unfortunately, the statutory 
definition of the term “disability” does not enable the achievement of 
this objective.  The shortcomings of the definition are analyzed in the 
following section. 
B. The Definition of “Disability” Under the ADA, Federal Regulations, and 
Judicial Interpretation 
Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination, 
prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals 
with disabilities because of their disabilities.51  The law also requires 
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to qualified 
applicants and employees unless doing so would pose an undue 
hardship for the employer.52 
The ADA provides a three-part definition of the term “disability”: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of . . . [an] individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.53 
The statute protects not only those with actual disabilities, but also 
those who are not currently disabled although they have a past record 
                                                          
 50. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) 
(prohibiting unlawful employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin); see also The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623 (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on age); The Equal Pay 
Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000) (prohibiting wage discrimination based on 
sex); discussion infra Part III.A.3 and note 256. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).  Specifically, the statute provides: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, 
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment. 
Id.  The term “qualified individual with a disability” is defined as “an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  Id. 
§ 12111(8). 
 52. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).  The provision states that unlawful discrimination 
includes: 
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an 
applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of such covered entity. 
Id. 
 53. Id. § 12102(2). 
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of a disability and those whom an employer wrongly regards as being 
disabled.54  The statutory text, however, does not provide any further 
details as to the meaning of the definition’s terms.  Phrases such as 
“physical or mental impairment,” “substantially limits,” and “major 
life activity” remain ambiguous and open to interpretation.55 
                                                          
 54. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (articulating 
the rationale for including individuals who are regarded as disabled within the 
protected class in a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which 
prohibits disability discrimination by entities receiving federal funds).  The Court 
reasoned that by amending the definition of “handicapped individuals” to include 
both those who are truly physically impaired and those who are incorrectly deemed 
impaired, Congress recognized that society’s myths concerning disability and disease 
are just as debilitating as limitations caused by actual disabilities.  Id. 
 55. The regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) do provide further explanation of the definitional terms.  
They define a “physical or mental impairment” as follows: 
(1) physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:  
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including 
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, 
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or 
(2) any mental or physiological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic 
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities. 
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001).  Furthermore, the regulations define the term “major 
life activities” to mean “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.”  Id. 
§ 1630.2(i) (2001). 
The question of when a condition that limits only an individual’s ability to work 
becomes a disability under the ADA presents difficulty.  The EEOC’s regulations 
explain that 
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working— 
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to 
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as 
compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and 
abilities.  The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute 
a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2001). 
The regulations further instruct that in determining whether an individual is 
disabled with respect to the life activity of working, one should consider the following 
factors: 
(1) the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access; 
(2) the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills, 
or abilities within that geographical area from which the individual is also 
disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or 
the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, 
skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is 
also disqualified because of the impairment. . . . 
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (2001). 
Finally, the federal regulations explain that the “regarded as” prong of the 
definition of disability is meant to protect any individual who: 
Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major 
life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; 
Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life 
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; 
or 
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It is clear, however, that the definition of “disability” requires an 
individualized assessment of each plaintiff’s level of functionality.56  
This mandate has generated a plethora of litigation, and in recent 
years several cases have reached the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court’s first decision concerning the ADA’s 
definition of disability was hailed as a victory for plaintiffs.  In the 
1998 case of Bragdon v. Abbott,57 the Supreme Court determined that 
the plaintiff’s asymptomatic HIV infection rose to the level of a 
disability because it substantially limited her major life activity of 
reproducing and bearing children.58  The Court, however, did not 
decide whether HIV constituted a disability per se, and therefore, the 
decision is quite narrow, applying only to those who are biologically 
able to reproduce and wish to do so but feel deterred by their HIV 
status.59 
In the cases following Bragdon, the Supreme Court has been less 
sympathetic to plaintiffs and has narrowed considerably the scope of 
the disability definition.  In Sutton v. United Air Lines, two severely 
myopic twin sisters brought complaints against United Air Lines 
because they were denied jobs after failing to meet the airline’s 
minimum visual acuity requirement for uncorrected vision.60  The 
Supreme Court decided that measures that correct or mitigate an 
impairment must be considered in determining whether a particular 
condition is a disability.61  Consequently, the Court determined that 
because their vision could be fully corrected with glasses or contact 
lenses, neither sister had an eligible “disability” under the ADA.62 
                                                                                                                                      
Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this 
section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting 
impairment. 
Id. § 1630.2(k) (2001). 
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has stated that the EEOC was 
not delegated authority to interpret the term “disability” as found in the ADA and 
has rejected some of the agency’s interpretations.  See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 
U.S. 471, 479, 482 (1999) (stating that no agency has been delegated the authority to 
interpret “disability,” including the EEOC). 
 56. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (assessing whether the 
plaintiff was substantially limited in her ability to reproduce). 
 57. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 58. Id. at 641. 
 59. Id. at 642. 
 60. 527 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1999). 
 61. Id. at 482. 
 62. Id. at 488-89.  The Court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove 
that they were disabled with respect to working because they were not precluded 
from a broad class of jobs.  Id. at 491-93.  Furthermore, they failed to prove that the 
employer regarded them as having a disability because the employer only considered 
them unable to hold the unique position of global pilot and did not perceive them as 
unable to work in any other type of job.  Id. 
HOFFMAN.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:10 PM 
2003] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND TITLE I OF THE ADA 1225 
In a companion case, Murphy v. United Parcel Service,63 the Court 
reiterated its conviction that for purposes of determining whether an 
individual has a disability under the ADA, the condition must be 
assessed in light of any available medications or mitigating 
measures.64  Thus, the Court found that the petitioner, a mechanic 
and driver with blood pressure exceeding Department of 
Transportation requirements, did not have a disability because when 
medicated, he functioned normally in daily activities.65  The Court 
further found that the petitioner was not protected under the 
“regarded as” prong of the definition of disability because UPS only 
perceived him as unable to perform the specialized job of mechanic 
with driving responsibilities, not as being generally unable to work as 
a mechanic.66 
In its most recent case concerning the question of what constitutes 
a disability under the ADA, the Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,67 found that despite suffering many 
limitations arising from carpal tunnel syndrome and other 
impairments, Ella Williams failed to prove that she was disabled in 
her capacity to perform manual tasks.68  Despite the fact that the 
ailments prevented her from dancing, sweeping, and sometimes 
dressing without assistance and limited her ability to play with her 
children, garden, and drive long distances,69 the Court, per Justice 
O’Connor, reasoned that because “she could still brush her teeth, 
wash her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do 
laundry, and pick up around the house,” she was unable to show that 
her ailments caused changes in her life that severely limited her from 
performing tasks that are essential to most people’s everyday lives.70  
Therefore, in applying this reasoning, the Court declared that 
Williams had failed to “establish a manual-task disability as a matter of 
law.”71 
The lower courts have been similarly restrictive in their 
interpretation of the term “disability.”  For instance, the courts have 
been loath to find that plaintiffs with cancer have a disability under 
                                                          
 63. 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 64. Id. at 521. 
 65. Id. at 520-21. 
 66. Id. at 524-25.  Note that in a third opinion issued the same day, Albertson’s Inc. 
v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566-67 (1999), the Supreme Court held that the Ninth 
Circuit erred in finding that a truck driver with amblyopia had a disability without 
identifying his specific degree of visual loss. 
 67. 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 68. Id. at 202. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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the ADA.72  An example may be found in Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 
Inc.73 where a patient diagnosed with breast cancer was treated with 
surgery and daily radiation therapy for six weeks and was able to 
continue working on a modified schedule without missing any days of 
work.74  After her job was eliminated, she filed suit, but the Fifth 
Circuit found that she was not disabled.75  Similarly, plaintiffs with 
diabetes,76 epilepsy,77 heart disease,78 and many other conditions have 
experienced difficulty in convincing courts that their ailments should 
qualify as disabilities, often because their conditions are controlled 
with medication.79 
C. Concerns Raised by the Definition of the Term “Disability” 
1. The vagueness of the terminology 
The ADA’s definition of “disability” contains vague terms such as 
“substantially limits” and “major life activities.”80  This terminology 
provides little guidance to courts and litigants as to who precisely is a 
                                                          
 72. See, e.g., Gordon v. E.L. Hamm Assoc., 100 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that a patient with lymphoma did not have a disability); Schwertfager v. City of 
Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (finding that an employee 
recovering from breast cancer surgery failed to prove she had a disability); EEOC v. 
R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding that a patient with 
leukemia did not have a disability), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 181 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 
1999).  For an analysis of the courts’ treatment of cancer cases, see Jane Byeff Korn, 
Cancer and the ADA:  Rethinking Disability, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (2001). 
 73. 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 74. Id. at 189. 
 75. See id. at 191 (finding that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in her 
ability to work). 
 76. See, e.g., Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (ruling that 
plaintiff’s diabetes was not an actual disability because he failed to show it limited a 
major life activity); Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 23 Fed. Appx. 811, 811-12 
(9th Cir. 2001) (determining that diabetes did not substantially limit an employee in 
a major life activity and thus he was not disabled under the ADA); Berg v. Norand 
Corp., 169 F.3d 1140, 1145 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that Berg’s diabetes, which 
limited her to forty to fifty hours of work per week, was not a disability under the 
ADA). 
 77. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp., 237 F.3d 349, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(finding that an employee who suffered from epileptic seizures was not disabled 
under the ADA); Arnold v. City of Appleton, 97 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Wis. 
2000) (holding that a firefighter with epilepsy failed to establish that he was disabled 
because his affliction did not substantially limit a major life activity). 
 78. Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 805-06 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(ruling that appellant did not offer evidence upon which the jury could determine 
that his heart condition limited his ability to work); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a man with high blood 
pressure and coronary artery disease was not disabled). 
 79. For case summaries relating to a large number of disabilities see AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT MANUAL (BNA) § 100 (1992). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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person with a disability.81  In a speech to business lawyers on March 
14, 2002, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explicitly 
criticized the ADA for failing to specify the intent of Congress.82  She 
stated that the statute exemplifies what occurs when a bill’s “sponsors 
are so eager to get something passed that what passes hasn’t been as 
carefully written as what a group of law professors might put 
together.”83 
Textual vagueness is sometimes an unavoidable or incurable 
defect.  Thus, a primary duty of the courts is to interpret statutory 
language, and they routinely do so in the course of deciding cases.84  
To carry out that duty, courts, at times, turn to legislative history, 
utilize “canons of construction” that have been developed as 
interpretive tools, or grapple with the plain text of the law.85 
Statutory language is often the product of political compromise, 
and therefore, is frequently imprecise.86  In the process of 
                                                          
 81. For articles criticizing the ADA’s definition of “disability” see Chai Feldblum, 
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law:  What Happened?  Why?  
And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91 (2000); Bonnie 
Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA:  A Return to the 
Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000); Cheryl L. Anderson, “Deserving Disabilities”:  Why 
the Definition of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised to 
Eliminate the Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 MO. L. REV. 83 (2000); Lisa 
Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities:  The Failure of the 
“Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405 
(1999); Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination:  The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997). 
 82. See Charles Lane, O’Connor Criticizes Disabilities Law as Too Vague, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 15, 2002, at A2 (stating that the Act left “uncertainties as to what Congress had 
in mind”). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 35 (1997) (stating that 
“[w]hatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the executive 
or (ultimately) the judicial branch”); see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of 
CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon:  Have the Lower Courts Taken A Good Thing 
Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 208 (1996) (discussing statutory construction, 
and in particular, the employment of the “remedial purpose canon” and its history). 
 85. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 84, at 14-37 (reviewing the “science of statutory 
construction,” including canons of construction); Watson, supra note 84, at 208-25 
(discussing canons of construction historically and contextually); Karl Llewellyn, 
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are 
to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1949-50) (stating that canons of 
construction are needed tools for arguing statutory meaning and, thereafter, listing 
the various canons employed by courts and attorneys). 
 86. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REV. 341, 350 (1949) (stating that “[e]verything that emerges from the 
legislative forum is tainted by its journey through the lobby”); Feldblum, supra note 
81, at 126-34 (discussing the politics of the ADA’s passage); Joseph A. Grundfest & 
A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:  The Value of Ambiguity in 
Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 640 (2002) (discussing how 
ambiguity of statutory language may be the result of a need to compromise in order 
to get legislation passed); SCALIA, supra note 84, at 34 (discussing the role of lawyer-
lobbyists and arguing that because of their involvement, legislative history is not an 
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negotiation, various parties agree to relinquish strong language that 
they had advocated in order to make the bill palatable to a sufficient 
number of legislators to win its passage, but the cost of the process 
may amount to the abandonment of wording that would have 
provided greater clarity.87 
In other instances, terminology is left deliberately vague for 
ideological reasons.  For example, Title VII, which prohibits 
discrimination based on religion, among other categories, defines 
“religion” as including “all aspects of religious observance and 
practice, as well as belief.”88  The definition is circular, referring to 
the term “religious” within its text and failing to instruct the courts 
precisely as to what activity or group is protected.  Courts, however, 
are committed to a long tradition of being very liberal in determining 
which beliefs are considered “religious” so that they will not be 
placed in the position of judging the legitimacy of various belief 
systems. In the words of one court deciding a Title VII case, 
“[s]incere beliefs, meaningful to the believer, need not be confined 
in either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of 
religion.”89 
One should note that the definition of “individual with a disability” 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 197390 is identical to the definition 
later adopted by the ADA.91  Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the 
authors of the ADA, explains the decision to incorporate the 
Rehabilitation Act’s definition into the newer statute as follows: 
Political advocates for people with disabilities in Washington 
preferred . . . [this] approach because, as a strategic matter, it 
seemed smarter to use a definition of disability that had fifteen 
years of experience behind it, rather than to attempt to convince 
                                                                                                                                      
appropriate tool for statutory interpretation). 
 87. Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 86, at 640. 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). 
 89. See Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F. Supp. 489, 490 (1981) (citing 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 
163, 165 (1965)). 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).  The Rehabilitation Act, which was enacted seventeen 
years before the ADA, prohibits disability discrimination by any program or activity 
receiving federal funds or being conducted by an executive agency or the U.S. Postal 
Service.  Id. § 794 (2000). 
 91. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2002), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) 
(incorporating the same language).  The Rehabilitation Act originally defined a 
handicapped individual as “any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability 
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to 
employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability 
from vocational rehabilitation services . . . .”  Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 
93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 361 (1973).  Because the definition was perceived as 
problematic and excessively narrow, the law was amended in 1974 to supplement the 
current language.  Feldblum, supra note 81, at 102-03. 
HOFFMAN.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:10 PM 
2003] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND TITLE I OF THE ADA 1229 
Congress to adopt a new, untested definition.  Moreover, although 
there had been, as noted above, a few adverse judicial opinions 
under Section 504 that had rejected coverage for plaintiffs with 
some impairments, those opinions were the exception, rather than 
the rule, in litigation under the Rehabilitation Act.92 
Feldblum further notes that under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
courts typically understood the definition to encompass any person 
with a medical condition that was not inconsequential, and thus, the 
courts seldom parsed the language of the definition to critically assess 
whether a person falls into the category of a “handicapped 
individual.”93 
Professor Ruth Colker has confirmed this analysis.  In a study of 
case outcomes under the Rehabilitation Act, Colker found that 
before 1994 the defendant success rates at the appellate level under 
the statute averaged only 64.9%.94  Notably, since 1994, the defendant 
win rates have risen to 87.5%, a figure comparable to the defendants’ 
appellate success rate under the ADA, which is 86.5%.95  Colker 
suggests that the change may be attributable to judicial hostility 
towards ADA plaintiffs, which is spilling over to Rehabilitation Act 
cases.96 
One might ask why the courts have changed their approach to the 
definitional language of the term “disability.”  If they rarely 
questioned plaintiffs’ disability status during the early years of the 
Rehabilitation Act, why do they scrutinize it so carefully under the 
ADA?  The answer most likely is rooted in the fact that the ADA 
extended the anti-discrimination mandate to private employers,97 
                                                          
 92. Feldblum, supra note 81, at 128. 
 93. Id. at 92.  There is nothing inherent in the definition of “disability” that 
requires the courts to interpret it restrictively or to engage in skeptical scrutiny of 
plaintiffs’ claims concerning the extent of their disabilities.  Instead, the courts could 
construe the definition liberally, accepting plaintiffs’ testimony that their 
impairments are substantially limiting and allowing all conditions that are not so 
minor as to be trivial to be included within the statutory scope.  See Feldblum, supra 
note 81, at 92 (discussing judicial attitudes towards the definition of “disability” 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).  As a civil rights act, the ADA is a remedial 
statute, and such statutes traditionally are liberally construed.  See NORMAN J. SINGER, 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 3A  § 74.05 (5th ed. 1992) (remarking that remedial laws 
provide previously non-existent rights and remedies to individuals, and they are 
generally interpreted to be broad and inclusive so that their “objectives may be 
realized to the fullest extent possible.”). 
 94. Ruth Colker, The Death of Section 504, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 219, 224-26 
(2002) [hereinafter Death of Section 504]. 
 95. Id. at 224-25. 
 96. See id. at 226-27 (suggesting additionally that defense lawyers may have 
improved their litigation skills and that inexperienced plaintiffs’ lawyers may have 
litigated poorly). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working 
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whereas the Rehabilitation Act applies only to programs or activities 
receiving federal funds or being conducted by an executive agency or 
the U.S. Postal Service.98  Under the Rehabilitation Act, the cost of 
compliance falls on the taxpayers, and thus, has a dispersed impact 
that generates comparatively little opposition.  By contrast, private 
sector employers that bear the burden of statutory compliance seem 
far more likely to hire resourceful, aggressive law firms to defend 
their cases and to pursue every potential avenue of attack, including 
each plaintiff’s status as a member of the protected class.99 
Textual vagueness is at times unavoidable.  However, excessively 
vague statutes failing to provide any certainty as to what conduct is 
prohibited, can be declared void for vagueness.100  A statute is 
voidable if a person of ordinary intelligence could not determine 
from its language that her conduct is prohibited, or if it does not 
provide the courts and the jury with sufficient guidance as to its 
standard of liability.101  One might argue that the ADA’s failure to 
more clearly delineate its protected class and to inform employers 
and the courts as to whom the anti-discrimination mandate binds is a 
serious flaw that leaves the law vulnerable to vagueness challenges. 
2. Individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s level of functioning 
Even more problematic than the textual vagueness of the statute is 
the requirement of individualized assessment and the focus on each 
plaintiff’s level of functioning. The ADA instructs courts to evaluate 
whether each plaintiff has “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of . . . [her] major life activities.”102 
Potentially, this standard could constitute a sophisticated and 
sensitive approach.  Judges are to review each individual’s personal 
circumstances carefully and use their discretion in determining 
plaintiffs’ disability status.  Such inclusiveness might be particularly 
appropriate because diseases manifest themselves differently in 
different individuals, and the degree to which they are disabling can 
vary over time.  Arguably, therefore, plaintiffs should not be excluded 
                                                                                                                                      
day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 
and any agent of such person”). 
 98. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1999). 
 99. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 140 (referring to the “sophisticated 
management bar trained in seminars to carefully parse the statutory text of the 
definition”). 
 100. SINGER, supra note 93, at 1A § 32A:4. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining “disability” as an actual “physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits” a “major life” activity or “a record of 
such impairment” or “being regarded as having such an impairment”). 
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from ADA protection based on rigid disease categories.  In reality, 
however, the individualized assessment mandate makes the ADA’s 
definition of disability unworkable, and therefore, must be 
abandoned. 
First, the requirement of individualized assessment leads to 
inconsistent and unpredictable court decisions.  One court assessing 
a plaintiff with a particular condition might find that the individual 
has a disability, while a second court assessing someone with the very 
same condition or a slight variation thereof could find that the 
person is not substantially limited with respect to a major life activity, 
and therefore, not entitled to statutory protection.103  In the words of 
one of the statute’s authors, “the idea that an individualized 
assessment would be used to determine whether one person with 
epilepsy would be covered under the law, while another person with 
epilepsy would not, was completely foreign . . . to the spirit of the 
ADA as envisioned by its advocates,” but this approach has been 
“cemented . . . in the courts.”104  Such divergent findings seem 
fundamentally unfair.  They also make it difficult for parties to 
evaluate the strengths of their cases for purposes of litigation and 
settlement and for courts to find reliable precedent. 
Second, the emphasis on individualized assessment and 
functionality levels leads the courts to examine the daily, private 
activities of plaintiffs in invasive and even humiliating ways.  In 
Williams, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff because it 
found that “she could still brush her teeth, wash her face, bathe, tend 
her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick up around the 
house.”105  Another plaintiff had to convince the court that her HIV 
substantially limited her ability to have sexual relations and to 
procreate,106 and yet another was required to describe in detail how 
her colitis affected her digestive and voiding functions.107  Sadly, in 
order to prevail in Title I cases, plaintiffs at times must compromise 
their privacy and dignity.108 
                                                          
 103. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 152 (noting the varied results that 
individualized assessments yield). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002). 
 106. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1998). 
 107. Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 108. See Paula E. Berg, Ill/legal:  Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category 
of Disability in Anti-discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 37-39 (1999) (noting 
that “[w]ithin the structure of disability determinations, the plaintiff’s body is an 
object to be investigated by lawyers, doctors, and vocational experts, and ultimately 
codified by a judge”). 
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Most problematic, perhaps, is the fact that the focus on 
functionality levels creates a “Catch-22” for plaintiffs.  If an individual 
has a condition that is controlled by medication or is not extremely 
severe, the individual is unlikely to be deemed to have a disability 
under the courts’ contemporary interpretations.109  Yet, if a person 
has a severe condition that is impervious to medication, she may not 
be considered “qualified” for the job.110  Thus, the window of 
opportunity for a plaintiff to be both disabled and qualified is quite 
narrow.111 
Additionally, the “regarded as” prong of the definition112 does not 
meaningfully broaden the scope of the protected class.  To prevail 
under the “regarded as” standard, a plaintiff must prove that the 
employer wrongly regarded her as having an actual disability, that is, 
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.113  While it 
is very difficult to prove that a condition truly constitutes a disability 
under the ADA, it is even more difficult to prove that a decision-
maker considered a condition to be a disability in his own mind.  This 
requires hypothesizing about the inner thoughts of another person, 
and the employer can easily claim that it considered the plaintiff’s 
condition to be an impairment that was not severe enough to rise to 
the level of a disability, thus avoiding ADA liability.114 
3. Cost concerns 
Unlike other federal anti-discrimination laws, the ADA imposes 
potentially significant direct costs upon employers.  Uncertainty 
concerning the scope or identity of the protected class that is to 
benefit from these expenditures is thus particularly disconcerting to 
courts and to employers. 
                                                          
 109. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) 
(holding that when a person’s impairment, physical or mental, is corrected by 
medication, that person “does not have an impairment that presently ‘substantially 
limits’ a major life activity”). 
 110. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) & 12112(a) (2000) (defining “qualified individual 
with a disability” and prohibiting discrimination only against those who are 
“qualified”). 
 111. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 145-46 (explaining that it is difficult to argue 
that an individual’s disability limits his “ability to perform a range of jobs,” but the 
individual “is nonetheless fully qualified for the position”). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2000). 
 113. Id. § 12102(2)(A), (C). 
 114. See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights:  Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 
276 (2000) (explaining how the EEOC’s and the court’s interpretation of the 
“regarded as disabled” prong effectively insulates employers from liability under that 
provision). 
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Title VII,115 the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”),116 and the ADEA117 prohibit 
discrimination based on race, national origin, gender, religion, and 
age on the theory that members of minority groups can perform 
work as well as non-minority employees, and therefore, should be 
given equal opportunities in the workplace.118  These statutes, 
consequently, target largely irrational employer conduct that is based 
on unfounded assumptions and prejudice, and they do not generally 
impose direct, out-of-pocket costs on employers.119 
The ADA similarly addresses irrational employer behavior in that it 
prohibits discrimination against qualified employees with disabilities 
because of their disabilities.120  For example, employers cannot 
decline to hire competent paralyzed individuals simply because they 
do not like having wheelchairs in the workplace.  Those with 
disabilities who can be productive workers cannot be excluded 
because of baseless fears concerning their possible limitations. 
                                                          
 115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). 
 116. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1998). 
 117. Id. §§ 621-634 (1999). 
 118. See Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability:  Utilization 
and Outcome, 549 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 55 (1997) 
(explaining that civil rights law is based on the notion that sex, national origin, 
religion, color, and race do not make people intrinsically different).  The statutes, in 
fact, provide employers with defenses to insure that they are not required to 
compromise standards to achieve compliance.  For example, Title VII and the ADEA 
allow employers to discriminate against individuals based on religion, sex, national 
origin, or age, when membership in a particular religion, sex, national group, or age 
group is “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) 
(2000); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1999).  The Equal Pay Act allows employers to pay 
men and women doing the same job different salaries in order to maintain a 
seniority system, a merit system, or a system that determines earnings by “quantity or 
quality of production.”  29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998). 
 119. One clear exception is Title VII’s mandate that employers reasonably 
accommodate employees’ religious beliefs.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000).  The 
Supreme Court, however, has determined that employers have only a de minimis duty 
to accommodate workers’ religious needs, and they are not required to absorb 
significant costs.  See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) 
(stating that “[t]o require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give 
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship”).  The ADA’s legislative history states 
that Congress rejected the minimal Hardison standard for ADA accommodations.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 1, at 68 (1998) (explaining that the principles outlined in 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison do not apply to the ADA legislation); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) (2001) (explaining that the undue hardship defense embodied 
in the ADA and in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires employers to 
demonstrate that accommodations would impose significantly greater expense or 
burden than needed to meet the de minimis standard employed by Title VII).  But see 
Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, Discussion Paper No. 344, 35 
(2001), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ (last 
modified Mar. 27, 2002) (arguing that the other civil rights statutes generate costs 
for employers as well, for example, in the form of loss of customers who do not wish 
to do business with minority employees). 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
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The statute, however, goes further and requires employers to 
absorb the costs of providing reasonable accommodations to 
qualified individuals whose disabilities might in fact adversely affect 
job performance.121  These costs can include not only the expense of 
providing assistive devices or other accommodations, but also 
diminished productivity, attendance problems, and increased health 
insurance and workers’ compensation insurance costs.122 
Further, the ADA imposes costs unevenly upon the business 
community.123  Some employers have multiple applicants and 
employees with disabilities, while others have none.124  How 
burdensome ADA compliance will be for any given employer thus 
depends entirely on the makeup of the employer’s applicant and 
employee populations. 
The reasonable accommodation requirement addresses the need 
for distributive justice.  However, justice cannot be promoted if 
policy-makers do not have a clear vision of the category of people 
who should constitute the beneficiaries of the law and receive societal 
resources.  Additionally, the lack of a well-defined protected class 
hinders the ability of employers to plan for necessary expenditures.  
It is in this regard that the concept of corrective justice can be 
enlightening, because it requires the identification of the specific 
minority group that is to benefit from governmental intervention.125 
                                                          
 121. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480-94 (1992) (attributing a variety of 
costs to the ADA, including business loss because of customer preference for 
associating with non-disabled persons, reasonable accommodation, and 
administrative expenses for state enforcement of the law).  While employers also 
bear the burden of accommodating employees’ religious beliefs under Title VII, this 
duty is minimal.  See supra note 119 (discussing religion and the de minimis duty of 
accommodation). 
 122. See Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Disabling the 
Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 725-28 (1994-95) (detailing the financial burden that 
ADA compliance imposes on employers). 
 123. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (surveying the costs of accommodation to 
businesses).  Accommodation costs are also unevenly distributed within society 
because only employers bear the burden of compliance under Title I of the ADA, 
even though they generally are not responsible for causing disability.  See id.  
Arguably, it is society at large that should bear this burden through taxation and 
social service programs.  See id. 
 124. See Arneson, supra note 22, at 29 (noting that the ADA is problematic in that 
it allocates the burden of assisting disabled job applicants to employers and 
ultimately shifts it to consumers who pay higher prices to finance the cost of 
accommodations). 
 125. See supra Part I.A (discussing the concept of corrective justice and its 
application to the ADA); see also infra Part III.A. 
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D. The ADA Deviates from the Traditional Civil Rights Model of Protecting 
a Discrete and Insular Minority 
The civil rights tradition advances the protection of “discrete and 
insular minorities,” a term first coined in the 1938 Supreme Court 
case, United States v. Carolene Products Co.126  In a footnote, Justice Story 
speculated about “whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry.”127  This language initiated the idea of 
heightened scrutiny for some minority groups.128  Traditionally, 
courts consider several factors in determining whether a group 
constitutes a discrete and insular minority deserving the benefit of 
heightened scrutiny.  These factors include: 
Whether the group’s defining characteristic is immutable; whether 
the group has suffered a history of discrimination; whether the 
group is in a position of political powerlessness; whether the 
group’s defining characteristic relates in any way to the individual’s 
ability to participate in, and contribute to, society; and whether the 
characteristic is beyond the control of the individual group 
member.129 
This approach is consistent with the scholar Louis Wirth’s 
definition of a minority.  Wirth defines “minority” as a “group of 
people who because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are 
singled out from the others in the society in which they live for 
differential and unequal treatment and who therefore regard 
themselves as objects of collective discrimination.”130 
In its introductory “Findings and Purposes” section, the ADA 
explicitly asserts that it is protecting a “discrete and insular 
minority.”131  It also affirms that individuals with disabilities have all of 
the qualities that characterize a discrete and insular minority, as 
                                                          
 126. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 127. Id. at 153 n.4.  For a discussion of the footnote, see generally Louis Lusky, 
Footnote Redux:  A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982). 
 128. See Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection:  A Comparison of Federal Protection Based on 
Disability and Sexual Orientation, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 323, 359 (2000) 
(discussing the concept of a “discreet and insular minority”). 
 129. Id. at 326-27 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
441-44 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. 
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 
(1973); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
 130. Louis Wirth, The Problem of Minority Groups, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE 
WORLD CRISIS 347, 347 (Ralph Linton ed., 1945). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). 
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described above.132  Specifically, it states that those with disabilities 
“have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position 
of political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that 
are beyond the control of such individuals.”133  The “Findings and 
Purposes” section, in fact, opens with a specific estimate of the 
number of individuals included in the category of individuals with 
disabilities:  forty-three million.134 
In truth, however, the concept of a discrete and insular minority 
remains elusive.135  No “discrete and insular minority” has an 
essentialist, universal definition.136  It is impossible to characterize real 
human beings, with their multitude of variations, as belonging to 
distinct categories with inflexible boundaries.137  Most classifications 
are likely to be under-inclusive, over-inclusive, or both.138  
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. § 12101(a)(1).  Chai Feldblum, one of the authors of the ADA, relates the 
following concerning the forty-three million figure: 
I can attest that the decision to reference 43 million Americans with 
disabilities in the findings of the ADA was made by one staff person and 
endorsed by three disability rights advocates, that the decision took about 
ten minutes to make, and that its implications for the definition of disability 
were never considered by these individuals.  Moreover, it was my sense 
during passage of the ADA that this finding was never considered by any 
Member of Congress, either on its own merits or as it related to the 
definition of disability. 
Feldblum, supra note 81, at 154. 
 135. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional 
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1074 (1980) (contending that society cannot be 
“objectively subdivided” into groups solely for the purpose of discernment and that 
“people draw lines, attribute differences, as a way of ordering social existence—of 
deciding who may occupy what place, play what role, engage in what activity”); see 
also Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 813-14 (1999) 
(observing that deciding which groups will be categorized as “discrete and insular” is 
not an easy task). 
 136. See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW:  THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007-09 (2d ed. 1998) (pointing out that essentialism has 
many problems, most of which relate to “overgeneralizations” and an attempt to 
“attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant subset of that 
group”). 
 137. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND 
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1990) (explaining that we use language to simplify the world 
because we have a limited capacity to comprehend the complexity of life and stating 
that “[w]e do not know how to describe individuals as unique except by reference to 
traits that actually draw them into membership in groups of people sharing those 
traits”).  Id.; see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19-53 
(2000); see also BARTLETT & HARRIS, supra note 136, at 1008 (noting that human 
cognition involves continuously placing people into mental categories).  Inevitably, 
these categories are either under- or over-inclusive, and consequently, are useful only 
for some purposes.  Id. 
 138. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 86, at 352-53.  The authors discuss “the 
classification of American citizens of Japanese ancestry” who were subjected to 
restrictions during World War II (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 
HOFFMAN.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:10 PM 
2003] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND TITLE I OF THE ADA 1237 
Nevertheless, in order to provide protection or benefits to those with 
particular needs, legislatures must describe and categorize the 
intended beneficiaries.139 
Federal anti-discrimination laws identify “discrete and insular 
minorities” through a variety of mechanisms.  In the case of the 
ADEA, an arbitrary age restriction of forty and above designates the 
protected class.140  In the case of sex discrimination under Title VII 
and the EPA, biological characteristics determine the protected 
class.141  With respect to race, religion, and national origin, the 
categories are arguably socially constructed.142 
The challenges inherent in delineating protected classes can be 
illustrated by several clear examples.  Women, who are traditionally 
considered a minority for civil rights purposes, are not statistically a 
minority.143  Similarly, race has no essentialist definition, but rather is 
perceived by many as a social construct.144  In Plessy v. Ferguson,145 for 
example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that whether one is 
considered white or black in a given state depends on how the state 
                                                                                                                                      
(1943)).  Id.  The category was under-inclusive because Americans of German or 
Italian ancestry might also have felt divided loyalties, and it was over-inclusive 
because it lamentably assumed that all Japanese Americans were disloyal.  Id. 
 139. See id. at 343-44 (stating that classification establishes the group of people 
who will either benefit from or be burdened by a law “which does not apply to ‘all 
persons’”). 
 140. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1999). 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1998) (prohibiting 
sex-based discrimination). 
 142. See, e.g., Linda A. Lacewell & Paula Shelowitz, Beyond a Black and White Reading 
of Sections 1981 and 1982:  Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist Acts, 41 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 823, 834-35  (1987) (discussing race as a social construct); see also Melanie 
Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women:  A Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 302 (2002) (citing Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the 
Imperative of Categories, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 213, 262 (1995), and arguing against the 
distinction between biological and social groups); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias 
in Equal Protection:  The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 
YALE L.J. 485, 495-96 (1998) (discussing controversy over whether race, sex, and 
national origin are biological or socially constructed categories). 
 143. See Angela D. Hooton, Constitutional Review of Affirmative Action Policies for 
Women of Color:  A Hopeless Paradox, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 391, 419 (2000) 
(questioning whether women can constitute a “suspect class” for purposes of Equal 
Protection analysis given that they constitute a majority of the electorate). 
 144. See Lacewell & Shelowitz, supra note 142, at 834-35 (explaining that race is a 
concept with social meaning rather than any taxonomic purpose); Michael Omi & 
Howard Winant, Racial Formation, in RACE CRITICAL THEORIES 123, 123 (Philomena 
Essed & David T. Goldberg eds., 2002) (describing race as a concept invoking 
biologically based human characteristics as a means of signifying and symbolizing 
social conflicts); CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE VIEW FROM AFAR 3-6 (Univ. of Chicago 
Press 1992) (rejecting biological theories of race in favor of an anthropological 
approach to cultural constructions of racial diversity). 
 145. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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in question has chosen to define racial status.146  Thus, a person of 
mixed blood could be considered white in one state and black in 
another.147  The definition of “religion” is similarly ambiguous, since 
the judiciary has broadly defined it to include any body of “[s]incere 
beliefs, meaningful to the believer, [and it] need not be confined in 
either source or content to traditional or parochial concepts of 
religion.”148 
The problem of discerning a “discrete and insular minority” is 
particularly acute in the case of individuals with disabilities.  Not only 
is it unclear what constitutes a “discrete and insular minority,” it is 
also unclear who, in particular, has a disability.  When one claims 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, 
or age, little proof is needed to determine membership in the 
asserted protected class, and little, if any, litigation revolves around 
such questions.149  By contrast, in the case of the ADA, the protected 
class has fluidity, and membership in it is often far from obvious. 
Individuals with disabilities do not uniformly possess the qualities 
that courts have come to evaluate in determining the existence of a 
“discrete and insular minority.”  Disabilities do not always constitute 
immutable characteristics that are beyond human control.  All people 
possess certain mental or physical limitations.  Few excel as Olympic 
athletes or math geniuses.  Whether or not our limitations constitute 
disabilities remains a matter of degree.150  Notably, unlike other 
characteristics protected by the civil rights statutes, some disabilities 
are caused by one’s own negligence or risk-taking behavior, such as 
smoking or car racing.  In addition, one’s disability status can change 
over time.  Those individuals born healthy may become disabled, and 
those individuals with disabilities can improve in health and 
functionality if they receive appropriate therapy.151  Furthermore, 
advances in medicine can render previously disabling conditions non-
                                                          
 146. Id. at 552 (noting “a difference of opinion” among states regarding the 
determination of race). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that although 
the Science of Creative Intelligence—Transcendental Meditation—is not a theistic 
religion, it is nonetheless protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution); see also Ali v. S.E. Neighborhood House, 519 F. 
Supp. 489, 490 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 
and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965)). 
 149. See Yoshino, supra note 142, at 495 (asserting that courts agree that race, sex 
and national origin are immutable characteristics). 
 150. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (requiring substantial limitation of a person’s 
major life activity to constitute a disability for statutory purposes) (emphasis added). 
 151. See Rulli, supra note 5, at 394 (calling individuals with disabilities an “open 
minority” because “almost everyone will become disabled at some point in his or her 
life”). 
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disabling.152  Advances in social science or popular attitudes can also 
change prevailing perceptions concerning whether particular 
conditions are disabilities.153  Mental illness and drug addiction are 
now considered disabilities,154 whereas previously they were 
considered to be the moral faults of the persons they afflicted.155 
Furthermore, it is impossible to assert that as a group, all those who 
are substantially limited in a major life activity have been subjected to 
a history of discrimination.  To be sure, there is a history of 
discrimination against people with certain disabilities.156  State statutes 
allowed for the involuntary sterilization of the “insane, idiotic, 
imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic.”157  Some states established jury 
service criteria that excluded those “afflicted with permanent disease 
or physical weakness.”158 Another shocking example of discrimination 
is a Chicago “ugly law” that was repealed only in 1974, providing that 
                                                          
 152. For example, many cardiovascular problems are currently effectively 
controlled by medication and are not disabling to patients. 
 153. See, e.g., Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally? Mental vs. 
Physical Illness:  Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and 
Exclusions from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the 
Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 
778-86 (1997-1998) (chronicling the development of state and federal recognition of 
mental illness as a form of disability for insurance and disability law purposes). 
 154. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000) (including mental impairments in the 
definition of “disability”); see also id. § 12114(b) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination 
against those enrolled in drug rehabilitation programs or those who have successfully 
completed such programs).  However, employers may terminate or refuse to hire 
individuals who are currently engaged in the use of illegal drugs.  See id. § 12114(a). 
 155. See, e.g., Matthew Antinossi, Note, Respect for the Law Is No Excuse:  Drug 
Addiction History & Public Safety Officer Qualifications . . . Are Public Employers Breaking 
the Law?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 711, 716-17 (1999) (pointing out that drug addiction has 
been recognized as a disease for decades); Nathaniel S. Currall, Note, The Cirrhosis of 
the Legal Profession—Alcoholism as an Ethical Violation or Disease Within the Profession, 12 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 739 (1989) (lauding the move away from the perception of 
alcoholism as a personal failing and towards the view of alcoholism as a disease); 
Karin A. Guiduli, Comment, Challenges for the Mentally Ill:  The “Threat to Safety” Defense 
Standard and the Use of Psychotropic Medication under Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1149, 1157 (1996) (noting the historical 
association of mental illness with “sin, evil, God’s punishment, crime, and demons”). 
 156. See Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 13, 
13-14 (Silvers et al. eds., 1998) (describing how courts in the past barred children 
with physical disabilities from schools and banned deformed individuals from public 
thoroughfares). 
 157. E.g., Title H.R.J. Res. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (acknowledging 
Virginia’s history of sterilizing those deemed to be “feebleminded”); see Buck v. Bell, 
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding one such law).  In a now infamous passage 
upholding Virginia’s sterilization law, Justice Holmes wrote that “[I]t is better for all 
the world, if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let 
them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit 
from continuing their kind.”  Id. 
 158. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-43 (1975), repealed by 1978 ALA. ACTS 594, at 712 
§ 11 (1978); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 59-804 ¶ 3 (1965) (barring anyone who “is an 
idiot or lunatic, or intoxicated,” without defining those terms). 
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[n]o person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way 
deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or improper 
person to be allowed in or on the public ways or other public 
places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose himself to public 
view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than 
fifty dollars for each offense.159 
Nevertheless, not all individuals with “disabilities,” as they are 
currently defined, have been subjected to a history of discrimination, 
nor are they consistently singled out for negative treatment by 
contemporary society.160  For example, people with arthritis or 
cardiovascular disease, conditions that can significantly limit several 
major life activities, are generally viewed positively.161  Thus, while one 
of the statutory goals purports to include those subjected to societal 
exclusion,162 the potential members of the protected class have not 
been marginalized uniformly. 
Individuals with disabilities, as currently defined, do not constitute 
a discrete and insular minority, to the extent that there is any 
common understanding of the term.  One approach to revising the 
statute is to focus on the goal of corrective justice and to reformulate 
the protected class so that it more closely resembles a discrete and 
insular minority.  This option is explored in a later section of this 
Article.163 
II. EMPIRICAL AND OTHER EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE ADA’S 
EFFICACY 
A careful reading of the statutory definition of the term “disability” 
makes it clear that the definition is flawed, and the statute requires 
revision.  One might still question, however, whether empirical 
evidence supports the conclusion that the ADA is failing in its mission 
to provide corrective justice for deserving individuals with disabilities.  
Unfortunately, only a limited body of empirical data currently exists, 
and in some cases, it leads to no clear conclusions.164  Nevertheless, a 
                                                          
 159. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1974).  See generally 
Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. 
L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1991) (noting that persons with disabilities were excluded from 
hospitals, theaters, restaurants, bookstores, and auction houses for many years). 
 160. See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 349 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 44 (1997) (observing that the intensity of prejudice 
towards persons with disabilities varies according to the nature of the impairment). 
 161. See id. (reporting no necessary correlation between social prejudice and 
severity of functional limitation). 
 162. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 163. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 164. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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number of indicators suggest that we are falling short of fulfilling the 
ADA’s goals. 
A. Employment Rates of Individuals with Disabilities 
Several studies have compiled data concerning the employment of 
individuals with disabilities since the enactment of the ADA, and the 
news is not encouraging.  According to one article, data from the 
Current Population Survey suggested that in 1998 only 26.6% of 
people with work disabilities had employment, and of these, only 
63.9% were employed full time.165  By comparison, 78.4% of 
nondisabled individuals were employed, and 81.5% of those were in 
full-time jobs.166  A relatively small 2000 survey of 535 people with 
disabilities and 614 without disabilities indicated that 32% of those 
with disabilities (ages sixteen to sixty-four) were employed in full time 
or part time jobs, compared with 81% of able-bodied people in the 
same age group.167 
A study conducted by MIT economists Daron Acemoglu and 
Joshua Angrist appears to show that the ADA has resulted in an 
overall reduction in the rate of employment of individuals with 
disabilities.168  The authors found that on average, disabled men 
between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-nine worked fewer weeks in 
1992 through 1995 than they did before the ADA’s enactment.169  
Men in the age range of forty to fifty-eight also exhibited a decrease 
in the number of weeks worked in 1992 and 1993.170  Acemoglu and 
                                                          
 165. Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, Part III:  Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
271, 272 (2000) (citing U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (1998), available 
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/disabcps.html (last modified Oct. 1, 
2002)). 
 166. Id.  The authors further note that the mean earnings of individuals with work 
disabilities holding full-time, year-round jobs were a scant $29,513 compared to the 
$37,961 earned by nondisabled individuals.  See id. (attributing this disparity in part 
to the fact that nearly 31% of people with work disabilities never completed high 
school, while only 17.5% of nondisabled persons failed to graduate). 
 167. The survey was conducted by Harris Interactive and the National 
Organization on Disability.  Harris Interactive & the Nat’l Org. on Disability, 2000 
N.O.D./Harris Survey of Americans with Disabilities, available at http://www.nod.org/ 
content/cfm?id=1076 (last visited Apr. 12, 2003) [hereinafter 2000 N.O.D./Harris 
Survey] (finding that 29% of disabled households lived in poverty compared with 
10% of nondisabled households).  The survey does not necessarily indicate 
improvement in employment rates for disabled people between 1998 and 2000.  
Rather, the discrepancy might be due to the relatively small sample size in the 
second survey. 
 168. DARON ACEMOGLU & JOSHUA ANGRIST, THE CASE OF THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6670, 
1998). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 12. 
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Angrist found no effect on the employment rates of disabled women 
aged forty to fifty-eight or on wage rates.171  Women under forty, 
however, suffered a decrease in their levels of employment after the 
ADA became effective.172 
Another researcher, Thomas DeLeire, confirmed these findings.  
His research revealed that the ADA led to a 7.2% decrease in the 
relative employment of individuals with disabilities, but to no change 
in relative wages.173  It is possible, therefore, that the ADA’s 
reasonable accommodation requirement has created additional 
incentives for employers to avoid employing individuals with 
disabilities.  Employers might calculate that the risk of detection of an 
unlawful hiring decision appears far smaller than the risk of 
employing disabled workers and incurring high accommodation 
costs. 
Several commentators, however, have offered explanations for 
these trends that are not related to the existence of the ADA or 
discrimination on the part of employers.  Possible explanations are 
increases in the receipt of federal disability payments, which disabled 
individuals do not wish to relinquish for the sake of working,174 and 
the 1990-91 recession.175  It is also plausible that the downward 
employment trend began before 1990 and continued thereafter 
without any link to the ADA’s passage.176  Another factor that might 
account for the findings is the difficulty of defining the category of 
                                                          
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 11.  Schwochau and Blanck paint these findings in a more positive light.  
See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 297.  The authors assert that Acemoglu 
and Angrist’s results actually suggest that due to the ADA, the number of weeks 
disabled women aged forty to fifty-eight worked increased relative to those worked by 
nondisabled women over the 1993-96 period, once relevant employment trends at 
the time of the study’s data collection are considered.  Id.  As for DeLeire’s findings, 
Schwochau and Blanck relate that individuals with disabilities resulting from injury 
have fared better since the passage of the ADA, and in particular, “disabled 
minorities [have seen] an increase in their probability of employment as did those 
with high school or college diplomas.”  Id.  In addition, they note encouraging data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (“SIPP”), which notes a 2.9% 
increase in employment among individuals with severe disabilities between the ages 
of twenty-one and sixty-four from 1991-92 to 1994-95.  See id. at 272 (citing this study 
as evidence against a “dismal picture” of the ADA as an abject failure). 
 173. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUMAN RES. 693, 704-05 (2000). 
 174. See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 296 (noting that these factors 
were taken into account in both the DeLeire and the Acemoglu and Angrist studies). 
 175. Id.; see also ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168, at 13; DeLeire, supra note 
173, at 708-10 (rejecting these possibilities because their respective studies were 
designed to account for these factors). 
 176. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 303 (pointing out that DeLeire 
presents a figure based on one of his models that reflects a downward trend in 
employment, which apparently began before the enactment of the ADA). 
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disabled workers.177  The studies discussed above relied on responses 
to a question in a government survey concerning the respondent’s 
disability status.178  Thus, some of those who identified themselves as 
having a disability might not have one under the ADA’s definition, 
whereas some of those who responded in the negative might actually 
have a disability under the ADA.179 
Some disability advocates emphasize the positive psychological 
effects of the ADA, a phenomenon that also tends to refute the 
argument that the statute’s enactment is directly linked to a decrease 
in employment rates among individuals with disabilities.180  David M. 
Engel and Frank W. Munger list five ways in which the law has 
impacted individuals with disabilities:  (1) by changing their self-
image and allowing them to envision more accomplished careers;181 
(2) by changing the way others perceive them and incorporating the 
language of ADA rights into daily-life discourse;182 (3) by encouraging 
employers to implement rights voluntarily, without legal challenge;183 
(4) by inducing institutions to make changes consistent with the ADA 
even if no individual requests these transformations;184 and (5) by 
educating children and adults to feel entitled to certain rights in 
society.185  Another scholar, Bonnie Poitras Tucker, asserts that the 
                                                          
 177. See id. at 298 (discussing the complexity and ambiguities associated with the 
definition of disability). 
 178. E.g., DeLeire, supra note 173, at 697-98; ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168, 
at 9; Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 280 (2000).  The 
question was:  “Does [the individual] have a health problem or a disability which 
prevents him/her from working or which limits the kind or amount of work he/she 
can do?”  ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST, supra note 168, at 9. 
 179. A more far-fetched suggestion is that the drop in employment levels, if it 
exists, is ironically attributable to an enhanced sense of self-worth felt within the 
disability community since the enactment of the ADA, which causes some to refuse 
certain types of work. See Jolls, supra note 119, at 280 (suggesting that the drop in 
employment levels might reflect an increased sense of self-worth which in turn would 
induce disabled persons to invest in education rather than in the workforce and to 
be more selective in the jobs they accept). 
 180. See generally David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Re-Interpreting the Effect of 
Rights:  Career Narratives and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 329 
(2001) (discussing the impact of the ADA on various disabled persons according to 
the different socioeconomic and psychological conditions of those individuals). 
 181. See id. (arguing that the availability of rights provided by the ADA might 
inspire persons with disabilities to “perceive many obstacles as the product of unfair 
treatment rather than personal shortcomings”). 
 182. See id. (explaining that this “discourse of rights” derives from many sources, 
including media coverage and what little enforcement of the Act that actually exists). 
 183. See id. (chronicling two instances in which accommodations were voluntarily 
provided). 
 184. See id. (using the example of colleges providing accommodations for disabled 
persons as evidence of this phenomenon). 
 185. See id. at 329-30, 332-33 (analogizing the impact of the ADA on the self-
esteem of disabled persons to the impact of the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
(“IDEA”) on the self-esteem of children in special education programs). 
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ADA has led people with disabilities to feel justified in requesting 
accommodations and to expect that their requests will be fulfilled.186  
Furthermore, Tucker notes that “the ADA has made society-at-large 
aware of the issue of disability, and has required the public to devise 
means of making society more accessible for people with disabilities 
in the future.”187 
It is difficult to judge whether those actually covered by the ADA 
have experienced lower rates of employment since the statute’s 
enactment.188  In light of the factors discussed above, one may fairly 
say that the “attribution of disemployment results to the ADA is 
premature.”189  Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the ADA has not 
resulted in the hoped-for dramatic increase in employment rates for 
individuals with disabilities, and two-thirds to three-quarters of this 
population remains outside the workforce.190 
B. Monetary Relief and Other Statutory Benefits 
It is extremely difficult to evaluate the extent to which the ADA is 
providing relief to those who actually suffer discrimination.  The only 
clear fact is that in the minority of cases that generate a decision on 
the merits in federal court, plaintiffs have an abysmal success rate.  
Little is known about the relief obtained by employees in other 
forums or through other avenues. 
1. Data gaps:  settlements, informal resolutions, and state court actions 
It has been reported that at least 90% of all filed cases settle before 
trial.191  Moreover, the overall proportion of filed-to-tried lawsuits may 
be as low as 2%.192  A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of civil 
                                                          
 186. See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door:  Inherent Flaws in the Civil 
Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 383 (2001) (asserting that this feeling of 
justification is “a necessary step toward changing societal values”). 
 187. Id. at 384. 
 188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
 189. Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 303. 
 190. Id. at 272. 
 191. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:  What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 4, 28 (1983) (stating that approximately 88% of the civil cases that 
went to ten courts studied by the Civil Litigation Research Project terminated in an 
outcome agreed upon by the parties); see also Anne Thérése Béchamps, Note, Sealed 
Out-of-Court Settlements:  When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?,  66 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 117, 129 (1990) (discussing the emphasis placed on encouraging settlements in 
the American judicial system); Rulli, supra note 5, at 371 (discussing the importance 
of settlements for the effective functioning of the judicial system). 
 192. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try:  Civil Jury Verdicts in a System 
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 63 (1996) (noting that the main functions of 
trials is not to resolve disputes, but to deter other trials and encourage settlements, 
and stating that only 2% of civil filings go to jury trial); Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy By 
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rights complaints filed in United States District Courts between 1990 
and 1998 revealed that in 1998, over 70% were dismissed before 
judgment, of which 35.2% were settled and 12.5% were voluntarily 
dismissed.193  A study of age discrimination suits filed under the 
ADEA194 revealed that approximately 58% of those cases settled.195  A 
survey of 4,310 employment discrimination cases filed in the 
Northern District of Illinois during the years 1972-1987 found that 
80% of those cases produced no district court opinion and that 40-
60% of all filed cases were resolved through settlement.196  No study 
or report has focused specifically on settlements in ADA cases, and 
this information is impossible to derive from publicly available 
materials.197  Consequently, employees with ADA complaints may have 
gained significant benefits and monetary recoveries through 
settlements.198 
Another unknown is the number of disputes resolved informally 
between employers and employees before litigation commences.  
Employers, for example, might provide many employees with 
reasonable accommodations at their request without challenging 
their status as disabled and without claiming that the accommodation 
is unduly burdensome.199  Employers might often wish to avert 
                                                                                                                                      
Consent:  The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 283, 288 n.11 (1999) (noting that approximately 4% of the filed civil cases in 
1990 resulted in trials); Rulli, supra note 5, at 371 (noting that recent studies indicate 
that the percentage of filed-to-tried civil cases has recently fallen from 4% to 2%). 
 193. Marika F.X. Litras, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts, 1990-98, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT (2000) (focusing on civil rights 
complaints related to employment, housing, welfare, voting, and other civil rights 
issues, excluding prisoner petitions). 
 194. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1999). 
 195. Rutherglen, supra note 13, at 513. 
 196. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip:  A 
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1137, 1146 (1990) (using a broad definition of “published”). 
 197. See Rulli, supra note 5, at 372 (stating that information concerning 
settlements of suits filed under Title I of the ADA remains difficult, if not impossible, 
to obtain); see also Scott Burris et al., Disputing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act:  
Empirical Answers, and Some Questions, 9 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 237, 251 (2000) 
(noting that statistics exist for the percentage of civil cases that settle, but no statistics 
exist for cases filed under the ADA); Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, 
88 A.B.A. J. 20 (2002) (noting that “[c]onfidential settlements are a mainstay of civil 
litigation in the United States”). 
 198. Professor Rulli reports that his study of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
revealed that in that district, between 47.1 and 62.6% of Title I cases settled.  See 
Rulli, supra note 5, at 372.  Rulli further suggests that ADA cases may settle less 
frequently than other types of cases for a variety of reasons, including the ADA’s 
complexity, plaintiffs’ moral convictions, and defendants’ desire to create 
disincentives for future litigation. Id.  No comprehensive information is available 
concerning ADA settlements in other regions. 
 199. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (establishing that the term 
“discrimination” includes failure to make a reasonable accommodation for the 
known limitations of an employee with a disability); see also Tucker, supra note 186, at 
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litigation to save costs and avoid negative publicity or erosion of 
employee morale.  Employees, therefore, are likely to be frequently 
benefiting from employers’ voluntary cooperation even in cases in 
which the employee’s disability status is uncertain. 
An additional data gap is the lack of information concerning 
plaintiff success rates in state courts under the ADA and state laws 
that prohibit disability discrimination.  Many of the states have 
adopted a definition of “disability” that is identical or very similar to 
that found in the ADA.200  In 1996 the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
                                                                                                                                      
383 (stating that “some people and entities are voluntarily providing the 
accommodations required by the ADA”). 
 200. State statutes that contain definitions identical to the ADA’s are:  
Discrimination in Employment:  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  § 41-1461(2) (West 1999); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(2.5) (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4) (1995); 
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02(5A) (1999 & Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-1 
(Michie 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-5-6(a) (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 225C.46(1)(a) (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(j) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 344.010(4) (Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:  2232(11) (West 1999); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 1(17) (West 1996 & Supp. 2002); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(d) (West 2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 213.010(4) (West Supp. 
2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19)(a) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(9) 
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.310(1) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 354-A:  2(IV) (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(M) 
(Michie Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168A-3(7a) (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
02.4-02(4) (Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (West 2001); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1301(4) (West 1987 & Supp. 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.100(1) 
(2001); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954 (West Supp. 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(4) 
(2000 & Supp. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1(4) (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 4-21-102(9) (1998); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(5) (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5) 
(1987 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(M) (Michie 2002). 
Some jurisdictions have adopted the ADA’s language in areas other than typical 
civil rights or employment legislation.  The Virgin Islands’ code has no law 
protecting the disabled in employment, yet it mirrors the ADA’s “substantially limits 
one or more of a person’s major life activities” language when defining disability in 
tax notification laws. V.I. CODE ANN. § 2498(a)(2) (1994).  Florida uses the ADA’s 
definition in its Fair Housing Act.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.22(7) (West 1997 & Supp. 
2002). 
Alabama and Mississippi have no comprehensive definitions of “disability.” 
The following state statutes define “disability” differently from the ADA:  ALASKA 
STAT. § 18.80.300(12) (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-102(3) (Michie Supp. 
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); IDAHO CODE 
§ 67-5902(15) (Michie 1995); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(I) (West 2001); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4553(7-A) (West 2002); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 11-
503(f) (1998 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:  5-5(q) (West 1993 & Supp. 2002); 
N.Y. EXEC. § 292(21) (McKinney 2001); P.R. LAWS ANN. § 501(d) (1999); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 43-33-560 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 74.29.010 (West 2001); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8) (West 1997 & Supp. 2001). 
Some states have language that is similar to the ADA’s, yet they lack key elements 
in their definitions:  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(i) (West Supp. 2002) (omitting 
“substantially”); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-2(3) (1998) (omitting “being regarded as 
having such an impairment”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(Subd. 13) (West 1991 & 
Supp. 2002) (substituting “materially” for “substantially”); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.5-3 
(Michie 1998) (omitting “being regarded as having such an impairment”); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 35-13-205(a)(ii) (Michie 2001) (omitting “record of such an 
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published a Civil Justice Survey of State Courts that found that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs in the seventy-five largest 
counties in the United States won forty percent of cases.201  The 
survey, however, did not distinguish among the different types of 
discrimination claims and thus provided no data specific to disability 
discrimination allegations.202  Extensive research revealed no other 
study or report concerning the outcomes of disability discrimination 
cases in state court. 
One might believe that the 1996 survey’s forty percent figure 
proves that disability discrimination plaintiffs enjoy greater success in 
state court than in federal court, but this is not necessarily the case.  
Studies of case outcomes filed under federal anti-discrimination 
statutes other than the ADA have shown that plaintiffs achieve a 
greater number of positive outcomes under those statutes even in 
federal court.203 
By extension, it stands to reason that plaintiffs might be winning 
forty percent of all employment discrimination cases filed in state 
court because of success in cases involving claims relating to race, 
gender, age, and other protected categories, while still experiencing 
significant judicial hostility to disability discrimination claims.  
Nevertheless, disability advocates have not, thus far, alleged that 
disability plaintiffs find state courts to be an inhospitable forum, and 
thus, plaintiffs may achieve more favorable results in state courts than 
they do in the federal forum.  To eliminate this uncertainty, studies 
should be conducted to determine the rates at which employers and 
plaintiffs prevail in disability discrimination cases filed in state court. 
2. EEOC charge processing 
The EEOC charge data serves as one source of specific information 
concerning ADA case outcomes outside of the judicial forum.204  The 
                                                                                                                                      
impairment” and “being regarded as having such an impairment”). 
 201. Lea S. Gifford et al., Contract Trials and Verdicts in Large Counties, 1996, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ (last modified Oct. 25, 2002).  Presumably, the cases 
surveyed included those asserting federal civil rights claims, state civil rights claims, 
and a combination of both. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 248, 253 (finding that judicial 
outcomes under Title VII appear to be more pro-plaintiff than those under the 
ADA); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 10, at 570 (showing that over fifty percent of 
sexual harassment cases filed in federal district court result in a win for the plaintiff). 
 204. Under the ADA, individuals must file a charge of discrimination with the 
EEOC and exhaust their administrative remedies before proceeding to file suit in 
federal court.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (stating that the “powers, remedies 
and procedures” for enforcement of the ADA shall be identical to those established 
for enforcement of Title VII).  Title VII provides private parties with a private cause 
of action, which can be pursued after they have received a right to sue from the 
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EEOC is the federal agency that enforces Title I of the ADA.205  
Between 1992 and 2002, the EEOC resolved 187,503 ADA charges, 
17.5% of which were resolved in the employees’ favor.206  These 
“merit resolutions” included negotiated settlements, withdrawal of 
charges after the charging party received the benefits she desired, 
successful conciliation of charges,207 and EEOC determinations that a 
charge had merit in cases where it could not be successfully 
conciliated.208  In its 32,742 merit resolutions, the EEOC obtained 
$436 million in monetary benefits for charging parties without 
litigation, averaging about $13,316 per resolution.209 
In recent years, the EEOC appears to have obtained less per claim 
under the ADA than it has under some of the other statutes that it 
enforces.  In fiscal year 2002, 4,123 ADA merit resolutions were 
reached, and the EEOC obtained $50 million for those charging 
parties, or, on average, approximately $12,127 per charge.210  By 
comparison, in fiscal year 2002, the EEOC had 11,930 merit 
resolutions in Title VII cases, for which it obtained $141.7 million (on 
average $11,877 per charge),211 2,694 merit resolutions under the 
ADEA for which it recovered $55.7 million in monetary damages (on 
average $20,675 per charge),212 and 290 merit resolutions under the 
                                                                                                                                      
EEOC.  Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 205. Id. § 12117(a). 
 206. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990 (ADA) Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-
charges.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter ADA Charges FY 1992-FY 2002].  
Although the 17.5% figure might seem low, it should be noted that 28.8% of charges 
were administratively closed without any decision on the merits of the case.  Id.  
Administrative closures occur because there is a failure to locate or establish contact 
with the charging party, the outcome of related litigation renders further processing 
of the charge inappropriate, there is lack of EEOC jurisdiction, or the charging party 
requests a right to sue in court before resolution of the issue.  Allbright, supra note 3, 
at 406. 
 207. Under the ADA, the EEOC must attempt to conciliate discrimination charges 
that are found to be meritorious to avoid litigation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).  
The provision states that the “powers, remedies and procedures” for enforcement of 
the ADA shall be identical to those established for enforcement of Title VII.  Title VII 
establishes that if the EEOC determines that the allegations in a charge of 
discrimination are true, it “shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.”  Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 208. See ADA Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, supra note 217. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id.  In 2000 the EEOC had 4,835 ADA merit resolutions for which it obtained 
$47.9 million in relief, averaging $9,907 per charge. Id. 
 211. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html (last 
modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 212. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act Charges FY 1992-FY 2002, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ 
adea.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
HOFFMAN.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:10 PM 
2003] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND TITLE I OF THE ADA 1249 
Equal Pay Act (EPA),213 for which it obtained $10.3 million in 
damages (on average $35,517 per charge).214 
While the relatively low monetary recoveries under the ADA 
deserve attention, an explanation may rest in the probability that 
some ADA charging parties seek primarily non-monetary benefits.  
The parties may wish primarily to receive a reasonable 
accommodation at work or to retain their jobs after a leave of 
absence, and therefore, might be satisfied with relatively small 
damages awards.  In addition, according to one study, the percentage 
of complainants obtaining favorable results with ADA charges is 
within the range of favorable results achieved under other statutes 
enforced by the EEOC.215  Between 1992 and 2000, 12.4% of charging 
parties received benefits under the ADA, while 10.9% received 
benefits under Title VII, 10.2% received benefits under the ADEA, 
and 15.2% obtained benefits under the EPA.216 
Many of the individuals who turn to the EEOC for redress of 
disability discrimination do not have conditions traditionally 
considered to be severe disabilities.  By far, the most common type of 
charge filed with the agency is for “orthopedic and structural 
impairments of the back,” as 15% of all ADA charges filed between 
1992 and 2002 involved these conditions.217  The EEOC reports that 
people with these impairments received $63,216,739 in dollar 
benefits during that time period, which far exceeds the relief 
obtained by the EEOC for those in any other disability category.218  
Likewise, individuals with allergies, chemical sensitivities, alcoholism 
                                                          
 213. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1998). 
 214. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Equal Pay Act Charges (includes 
concurrent charges with Title VII, ADEA, and ADA) FY 1992-FY 2002, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/epa.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 215. See Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate:  An Empirical Study of the 
Implementation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, 50 KAN. L. REV. 1, 44 (2001) (comparing the results of processing ADA 
charges by the EEOC with other types of charges filed by the EEOC, such as charges 
under Title VII and the ADEA). 
 216. Id. at 44.  More specifically, the study’s findings break down as follows: 
Charging parties withdrawing charges with benefits:  ADA—5.1%; Title VII—
4.5%; ADEA—5.1%; EPA—6.2%; 
Charging parties receiving settlements:  ADA—5.5%; Title VII—5.3%; 
ADEA— 4.4%; EPA—7.4%; and 
Successful conciliation:  ADA—1.8%; Title VII—1.0%; ADEA—0.7%; EPA—
1.5%. 
 217. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by 
Impairments/Bases-Merit Factor Resolutions, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats.ada-
receipts.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 218. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data—Monetary 
Benefits, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-monetary.html (last modified 
Feb. 6, 2003). 
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and drug addiction received $11,499,864 in monetary relief.219  
Hearing impairments, vision impairments, paralysis, and non-
paralytic orthopedic impairments, other than back problems, 
constituted only 15.3% of charges filed during the same period even 
though these are probably the conditions that are most commonly 
thought of as disabilities.220  The 15.3% figure offers further evidence 
that many of the most seriously disabled do not attempt to enter the 
workforce, and those that do may not feel empowered to combat 
unlawful discrimination by seeking governmental intervention. 
C. What Is Known and What Is Not Known 
The available data indicate that the ADA has not achieved an 
increased employment rate for individuals with disabilities.221  The 
evidence is far less conclusive in the area of dispute outcomes.  Much 
remains unknown concerning settlements, informal dispute 
resolution in the workplace, and the outcomes of state court cases, 
which have not been comprehensively studied. 
Nevertheless, the startlingly low plaintiff win rates in federal court 
reveal that the ADA rarely functions as an effective remedial 
mechanism when cases come before federal judges.222  Furthermore, 
EEOC statistics divulge that many individuals who seek redress under 
the statute do not have what are traditionally thought of as severe 
disabilities, and thus a significant portion of those who obtain relief 
from employers may not be the most needy or deserving plaintiffs.223 
                                                          
 219. Id. 
 220. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by 
Impairments/Bases—Receipts, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html 
(last modified Feb. 6, 2003).  The EEOC obtained a total of $64,965,341 in monetary 
relief for individuals with these impairments.  By category, the relief obtained is as 
follows: $9,771, 179 for the hearing impaired; $9,760,423 for the visually impaired; 
$3,254,882 for those with paralysis; and $42,178,857 for those with non-paralytic 
orthopedic impairments other than back problems.  U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data—Monetary Benefits, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-monetary.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 221. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans With Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 1019-20 (2003) (stating that the failure of the ADA to 
effectively increase the employment rate for individuals with disabilities is due to the 
restrictive judicial interpretation of the term “disability” within the Act); S. Elizabeth 
Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue:  Why Disabilities Law Claims Are 
Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 606 (2001) (introducing some commentators’ 
thoughts as to why the ADA has not increased the employment rates for individuals 
with disabilities); see generally Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165 (stating that the 
ADA has not led to increased employment among disabled people). 
 222. See American Bar Association, Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I 
Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 
403-04 (1998) (dispelling the myth that the ADA burdens employers by presenting 
results of a study of 1,248 ADA Title I cases that showed that the defendants won 92% 
of the time). 
 223. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by 
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While it might be premature to conclude that the ADA is fully a 
“windfall for defendants,”224 the evidence makes it reasonable to 
deduce that the statute is falling short of satisfactorily meeting the 
goal of corrective justice.225  Regardless of the empirical data, 
however, Title I of the ADA is flawed because of its definition of the 
term “disability,” which hampers the promotion of the law’s 
objectives.  A variety of alternatives for amending the ADA’s statutory 
definition will be explored in the remainder of this Article.226 
III. AMENDING THE ADA:  OPTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND 
ANALYSIS 
A. The Recommendation:  Redefining Individuals with Disabilities As Those 
with Mental or Physical Impairments that Have Been Subjected to A Pattern 
of Discrimination and Developing Specific Categories of Covered Impairments 
1. The general principle 
This Article argues for the jettisoning of the ADA’s current 
definition of “disability” and the adoption of a new approach. 
Individuals with disabilities should be defined as those with mental or 
physical impairments that have been subjected to a pattern of 
discrimination by public policy or widespread private practice.227  The 
ADA should further authorize the EEOC to determine which 
disabilities have been associated with systematic discrimination and to 
publish guidance listing the covered conditions or disability 
categories.  Those with impairments that fit the listed criteria would 
be presumed disabled.  Those whose conditions do not fit within any 
of the listed categories would be presumed non-disabled, though they 
would be free to submit to the EEOC a request, along with a 
supporting brief, arguing that their impairments be added to the list 
of covered conditions the next time the list is reviewed and updated. 
                                                                                                                                      
Impairments/Bases—Receipts, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html 
(last modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 224. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 4, at 103-10 (arguing that suits 
filed under the ADA since its inception overwhelmingly result in a victory for 
defendants). 
 225. See id. at 126 (comparing the troubling statistics that indicate a 92% victory 
rate for defendants in ADA Title I cases with Congress’ intent in passing the ADA, 
which was to eliminate discrimination for the forty-three million Americans with 
disabilities). 
 226. See discussion infra Part III (providing options, recommendations, and 
analysis for amending the definition of the term “disability” found within the ADA). 
 227. The “record of” and “regarded as” branches of the definition should be 
retained.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
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The proposed amendment would address many of the problems 
that plague the current definition.228  With clear guidance and a 
categorical list of covered impairments, courts are less likely to reach 
inconsistent decisions and will not need to make invasive inquiries 
concerning each plaintiff’s daily life activities.229  Furthermore, 
plaintiffs will no longer need to prove the severity of their disabilities 
to attain protected status, avoiding the conundrum of having to 
establish both substantial limitation and job qualification.  In 
addition, those whose symptoms are controlled with medication will 
not be excluded from coverage so long as their underlying conditions 
meet a listed criteria.230  Thus, employers who exclude persons with 
epilepsy or mental illness because they do not want such individuals 
in their workplaces will no longer be able to avoid liability simply by 
asserting that these plaintiffs’ ailments are sufficiently controlled by 
mitigating measures. 
In general, under the new definition, the ADA’s protected class 
would become more easily discernible and would more readily 
resemble the traditional model of a discrete and insular minority.  As 
a consequence, the courts would no longer struggle with the 
definition of disability in each case, and the goal of corrective justice 
could be more effectively promoted.231 
2. The mechanics:  determining disability status under the proposed     
standard 
The task of establishing a mechanism by which to determine what 
constitutes a disability under the proposed definition is a complex 
and challenging one.  The following is a suggested approach that 
would likely need to be adjusted and refined as the system is tested 
through time. 
The EEOC should be assigned the task of developing a list of 
impairments and categories of conditions associated with a known 
pattern of discrimination.  Establishing the list of disabilities that have 
been the targets of discrimination will initially be demanding and 
time-consuming, and it should be delegated to a special EEOC 
department with appropriate experts.  This department should also 
periodically review and update the list in light of emerging 
                                                          
 228. See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 229. See infra note 297 (discussing circumstances under which disputes and 
inconsistent decisions concerning disability status may still arise). 
 230. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (holding that 
the court should evaluate mitigating circumstances when determining whether an 
individual qualifies as a person with a disability under the ADA). 
 231. See supra Part III.A.4 (discussing the impact of the proposed revision on the 
ADA’s current protected class). 
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information concerning contemporary discriminatory trends and 
medical developments or findings that might influence such trends. 
The EEOC would have to turn to a variety of data sources to gather 
evidence concerning patterns of discrimination.  First and perhaps 
foremost, it should turn to historical evidence.  It is well known, for 
example, that individuals with mental disabilities and epilepsy have 
been subjected to extreme forms of discrimination.  In the past, many 
state statutes allowed for the involuntary sterilization of the “insane, 
idiotic, imbecile, feebleminded or epileptic.”232  Approximately 60,000 
Americans were involuntarily sterilized pursuant to state eugenics 
laws throughout the country.233  Similarly, individuals with obvious 
disfigurements have often been marginalized.234  There is convincing 
evidence that deaf individuals have traditionally been subjected to 
discrimination.235  Likewise, individuals with contagious diseases have 
been subjected to widespread exclusionary practices.236  The case of 
HIV is a contemporary example.  HIV positive persons have been 
excluded by employers, educational institutions, and other segments 
of society.237  Individuals with paralysis and blindness have also been 
                                                          
 232. See, e.g., H.R. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (honoring the memory of 
Carrie Buck who was the first person sterilized under Virginia’s 1924 Eugenical 
Sterilization Act). 
 233. See, e.g., id. (indicating that Virginia sterilized approximately 8,000 people, 
while 60,000 were sterilized throughout the United States).  In 2001, the Virginia 
General Assembly issued a joint resolution expressing its regret for its former policy 
and noting that some of those affected had no mental impairment at all.  H.R.J. Res. 
607, 2001 Sess. (Va. 2000); see S.J. 79, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002) (noting that 
Raymond Hudlow, who was sterilized after being committed to the Virginia Colony 
for Epileptics and Feebleminded because he had repeatedly run away from his 
abusive father, later had a distinguished military career during World War II). 
 234. See, e.g., supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 235. See PAUL HIGGINS, OUTSIDERS IN A HEARING WORLD 25-27 (1980)  (tracing the 
history of discrimination against deaf individuals).  For example, in the 1800s, 
owners of all ships arriving in the United States were legally required to provide the 
names of all deaf persons on board and to pay bond to keep the deaf persons from 
becoming public charges.  Id. at 25.  Many states held deaf individuals incompetent 
to make contracts.  Id.  According to the author, hearing workers are still frequently 
promoted over deaf workers, even when the hearing employees were trained by 
those same deaf workers.  Id. at 27.  See also Randy Lee, Equal Protection and A Deaf 
Person’s Right to Serve As A Juror, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 81, 96 (1989-90) 
(providing examples of “irrational restrictions” on deaf individuals in the twentieth 
century). 
 236. See Michael Adam Burger & Lourdes I. Reyes Rosa, Your Money and Your Life! 
AIDS and Real Estate Disclosure Statutes, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 349, 368 (1993) 
(discussing a real estate agent’s ability to disclose the HIV status of someone who 
died in a seller’s house, indicating that “history demonstrates that fear and ignorance 
lead to discrimination, both inside and outside the context of contagious diseases”); 
see also Deborah Weinstein, Employment Discrimination:  AIDS Education and Compliance 
with the Law, 1 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 85, 103 (1992) (examining how the ADA 
will affect those with AIDS, stating that “[t]hroughout history and across cultures, the 
law has not protected people with contagious diseases from discrimination”). 
 237. See Scott Burris, Disease Stigma in U.S. Public Health Law, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 
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marginalized by virtue of the fact that architectural and 
communication barriers have made many of mainstream society’s 
goods and services inaccessible to people with those impairments.238 
Admittedly, while discrimination against individuals with certain 
disabilities is already well known,239 there is generally a dearth of 
scholarship in this area.  To the extent possible, research would need 
to be conducted to develop comprehensive records of laws, 
regulations, policies, and practices that sanctioned discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities. It should also be noted that if the 
EEOC finds that a particular condition was targeted for 
discrimination in the past, but it is convinced that societal attitudes 
have changed and that no such discrimination occurs in the present, 
the impairment should not be included in the list of covered 
disabilities. 
For purposes of determining which impairments fall within the 
ADA’s scope, the EEOC should consider discrimination by both 
public and private entities that has been instituted by law, regulation, 
policy or common business conduct.  The agency should also focus 
not only on discrimination in employment, but also on exclusionary 
policies in other realms, such as health care, education, and public 
life.  For example, the practices of sterilizing individuals with mental 
disabilities and barring those with obvious disfigurements from 
appearing in certain public places240 justifies inclusion of these 
impairments within the scope of the statute, even though these forms 
of discrimination occurred outside the workplace.  The ADA’s 
findings suggest the appropriateness of these criteria.  They speak of 
a general history of “purposeful unequal treatment” and of 
individuals with disabilities being “relegated to a position of political 
                                                                                                                                      
179, 186 (2002) (arguing that “obscenity review rules, criminal exposure laws, 
immigration restrictions, and mandatory testing requirements” are types of structural 
discrimination that both authorize and even require discrimination against those 
with HIV). 
 238. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000) (referring to the “discriminatory effects of 
architectural, transportation, and communication barriers . . . [and] failure to make 
modifications to existing facilities and practices”). 
 239. See, e.g., HIGGINS, supra note 235, at 23-29 (criticizing early scholars’ 
assumptions about deaf individuals); JAMES W. TRENT, INVENTING THE FEEBLE MIND:  A 
HISTORY OF MENTAL RETARDATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1994) (tracing the 
development of social programs and public treatment of individuals with mental 
disabilities from the 1840s to the 1980s); Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the 
World:  The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841, 851 (1966)  (indicating 
that disabled persons have been turned away from places where, legally, the public is 
to be accommodated). 
 240. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (allowing the sterilization of Carrie Buck 
after she gave birth to an allegedly “feeble-minded” child); see also supra note 159 and 
accompanying text. 
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powerlessness in our society.”241  The concern, therefore, is societal 
discrimination in all realms of life. 
Where historical evidence is not available,242 the EEOC could utilize 
census data, national polls, and studies that are conducted by either 
the agency or other institutions.  These sources would be useful in 
determining which disabled individuals are currently excluded from 
the workplace and other segments of society.  The ADA itself refers to 
the information in these sources as providing support for the passage 
of anti-discrimination legislation.243 
The EEOC could also look at its own records of discrimination 
charges.  If certain conditions are particularly prevalent in its 
inventory and if many of the charges of discrimination involving 
those conditions have generated merit-based resolutions, those 
conditions should be added to the list of covered impairments.244  
Thus, the EEOC might add cancer and carpal tunnel syndrome to its 
list, if its statistical data supports their inclusion. 
The EEOC will continue to gather information about 
contemporary discriminatory practices.  Since individuals can file 
EEOC charges without an attorney,245 many charging parties are 
unlikely to know the contents of the categorical list and will, 
consequently, file charges of discrimination involving conditions that 
are not included.  The EEOC could dismiss such charges without 
investigation because those individuals will be presumed non-
disabled.  However, the agency should periodically review its 
inventory, and if it becomes apparent that a large number of 
                                                          
 241. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000). 
 242. It should be noted that it is not clear when evidence becomes “historical.”  
There is no line of demarcation as to the passage from “contemporary trends” to 
“history.”  For example, is discrimination against those with HIV “historical” or 
“contemporary,” given that it began only after the disease was first identified in 1981?  
See Carlos Del Rio & James W. Curran, Epidemiology and Prevention of Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, in 1 PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1340 (Gerald L. Mandell et al. eds., 2000) 
(emphasizing that while communicable disease law has historical roots, HIV does not 
have the same historical depths); see also Paul Cartledge, What is Social History Now?, in 
WHAT IS HISTORY NOW? 23-24 (David Cannadine ed., 2002) (exploring the notion of 
the “time of history” and indicating that historians need not necessarily think in 
terms of millennia or centuries rather than decades or years). 
 243. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2000) (observing that different sources such as 
national polls have shown that disabled individuals “occupy an inferior status in our 
society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and 
educationally”). 
 244. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, ADA Charge Data by 
Impairment/Bases—Receipts (providing charge statistics received from July 26, 1992 to 
September 30, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/ada-receipts.html (last 
modified Feb. 6, 2003). 
 245. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000) (stating that a charge may be filed under 
the EEOC by the person aggrieved or on behalf of the person aggrieved). 
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individuals with a particular non-covered condition are filing charges 
of discrimination, the EEOC should commence a study or inquiry to 
determine whether employers are commonly discriminating against 
qualified applicants and employees with the impairment.246  
Furthermore, individuals whose charges are dismissed because they 
do not meet the definition of “disability” could submit a request to 
the EEOC’s reviewing department, along with a supporting brief, 
arguing that their conditions should be added to the list. 
The rare instances in which impairments, such as HIV, are newly 
discovered could present a unique challenge for the EEOC.  In many 
instances, discrimination against those with newly discovered 
conditions will be prohibited because the impairments will fall into 
one of the pre-existing categories on the list, such as mental 
impairment, disfigurement, or contagious disease.  When this is not 
the case, the new conditions should be withheld from the list until 
proof exists of a pattern of discrimination against individuals with 
those ailments.  Consequently, there would be a lag time between the 
initial appearance of discrimination and its prohibition with respect 
to the impairment in question. 
Nevertheless, the lag time should be short and could be quite 
useful.  The process would be expedited by the allowance of charging 
party petitions to the EEOC and by the mandate that charge 
inventories be periodically reviewed to discern emerging patterns of 
discrimination.  A certain amount of time might, in fact, be necessary 
in some instances to allow medical professionals to determine 
whether it is safe for individuals with the new condition to work in 
particular environments and how they can best be accommodated.  It 
might be unreasonable to require businesses to employ such 
individuals without reliable data providing assurance that their 
employment will not compromise their own welfare or that of others 
in the workplace247 or significantly erode the integrity of the 
business.248 
                                                          
 246. The EEOC could initiate a Commissioner’s charge concerning the condition.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000) (discussing the ability of a member of the Commission 
to file a charge).  It could then investigate the matter by interviewing some of the 
charging parties and employers in question and gathering available medical and 
employment documentation to evaluate the strengths of the discrimination claims. 
 247. Employers need not hire or retain an individual who would pose a direct 
threat to herself or others.  See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (finding that the ADA permits a regulation of the 
EEOC that authorizes employers to refuse to hire a person with a disability if job 
performance would endanger that person’s own health). 
 248. Employers are not required to hire or retain an individual who is not 
qualified for the job or cannot be reasonably accommodated.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 
12112(b)(5)(A), 12112(b)(6) (2002) (providing exceptions for employers who can 
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An additional difficulty is created by the fact that some conditions, 
such as vision and hearing impairments, vary by degree from mild to 
severe.  The EEOC would have to determine at what level of severity 
ADA coverage applies.  For example, the agency could determine 
that statutory protection is triggered by a diagnosis of legal blindness 
and that those who merely need corrective lenses are not covered, 
because they are not routinely subject to societal discrimination.  
Similarly, those with hearing loss may not be covered unless they wear 
hearing aids, which are a visible indication of their impairment that 
could leave them vulnerable to discrimination.249 
The list is unlikely to be extensive.  While some conditions, such as 
epilepsy, HIV, deafness, and blindness would be named individually, 
others would be categorized in broader classifications, such as mental 
impairments,250 contagious diseases, and disfigurements due to illness, 
injury, or medical procedures. The “record of” and “regarded as” 
prongs of the definition would still be useful under the new statutory 
definition.251  To illustrate, if a disease such as HIV becomes curable, 
individuals might face discrimination because of their medical record 
of having suffered a life-threatening, contagious disease, even though 
they have been fully cured.  Likewise, if an individual is wrongly 
perceived by an employer as having mental illness or a contagious 
disease and is consequently subjected to an adverse employment 
decision, she could be covered under the “regarded as” category. 
Finally, the designation of specific categories of covered disabilities 
will not prevent each case from receiving individualized attention 
from the courts because the courts will still engage in an independent 
                                                                                                                                      
prove that accommodating the disabled worker would create an undue hardship for 
the employer or that the individual lacks the requisite job qualifications). 
 249. See HIGGINS, supra note 235, at 25-27 (emphasizing the obstacles faced by deaf 
persons in the workplace, particularly highlighting a civil service requirement that a 
worker be able to hear conversational speech for particular jobs); Lee, supra note 
235, at 96 (discussing the history of discrimination against deaf individuals, including 
in the workplace). 
 250. This is a very broad category, but its breadth is justified by the history of 
discrimination suffered by individuals who were considered in any way mentally 
impaired.  The sterilization laws, for example, applied to the “insane, idiotic, 
imbecile, feebleminded, or epileptic.”  See H.R. 299, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2002).  
Mental impairments should include learning disabilities, mental retardation, manic 
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, brain-head injury, clinical depression, and 
other psychological disorders.  If appropriate, the EEOC could, however, narrow this 
category to exclude conditions that are not associated with systematic discrimination, 
as might be true for certain phobias.  The ADA already explicitly excludes from the 
definition of disability the following:  transvestitism, transsexualism, pedophilia, 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania, 
or pyromania; or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal 
use of drugs.  42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (2000). 
 251. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B)-12102(C) (2000). 
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assessment of issues other than disability status.  It will merely 
diminish litigation concerning the threshold question of membership 
in the protected class.  When a plaintiff meets one of the listed 
criteria, the question of whether that plaintiff is disabled will be 
answered, but the court will have to evaluate several other issues, such 
as whether the employer acted with discriminatory animus, whether 
the plaintiff was qualified for the job in question,252 whether 
requested accommodations were reasonable,253 and whether the 
individual posed a direct threat in the workplace.254 
3. Achieving corrective justice and other justifications for the proposed 
standard 
In general, the classes protected by the federal anti-discrimination 
laws are groups that are known to have experienced systematic 
discrimination in this country.255  Historical records provide strong 
justification for the need for government intervention to safeguard 
the rights of African-Americans, women, members of minority 
religions, those with certain national origins, and the elderly, since 
each of these groups has suffered discrimination both in the past and 
the present.256  Corrective justice257 is, therefore, the operative goal 
within the civil rights model. 
                                                          
 252. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting an employer from 
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability). 
 253. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (requiring an employer to make reasonable 
accommodations for disabled individuals). 
 254. See id. § 12113(b) (granting the employer a defense for not hiring a disabled 
individual if the individual posed a direct threat to health or safety in the workplace); 
see also infra Part III.A.5 for a discussion of whether the proposed revision will 
generate cost savings. 
 255. See id. § 12101(a)(discussing the history of discrimination in the United 
States against individuals with disabilities). 
 256. See MINOW, supra note 137, at 47 (stating that “we confront historical practices 
giving particular significance to traits of difference along lines of race, ethnicity, 
disability, gender, and religion”).  With respect to religious discrimination, see 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) 
(hypothesizing that when the Founders wrote the First Amendment, its protections 
were meant to extend only to the various Christian sects) and MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, 
TURKS, AND INFIDELS 11-14 (1984) (describing state constitutional provisions that 
prohibited non-Christians or non-Protestants from holding office).  Concerning 
national origin discrimination against Hispanics, see Johnson v. DeGrady, 512 U.S. 
997, 1013 (1994) (discussing historical discrimination against Hispanics with regards 
to voting).  With respect to sex discrimination, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 684 (1973) (providing insight into a history of “romantic paternalism” that has 
been rooted in the national consciousness of the United States).  The history of 
discrimination against African Americans and Japanese Americans in this country is 
also well known.  See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989a(a) (2000) (providing that Congress 
recognizes the wrongs committed against those of “Japanese ancestry by the 
evacuation, relocation, and internment of civilians during World War II”); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(discussing race discrimination in the United States); Korematsu v. United States, 
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Defining disability by reference to known patterns of 
discrimination would be consistent not only with the other federal 
anti-discrimination laws, but also with the language of the ADA itself.  
The ADA’s “Findings and Purposes” section twice mentions the 
history of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.  In its 
second paragraph, it asserts that “historically, society has tended to 
isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities,”258 and in its seventh 
paragraph, it refers to the “history of purposeful unequal 
treatment”259 to which this population has been subjected. 
This article argues that historical records of discrimination should 
be utilized as a primary source of evidence for purposes of 
establishing the list of covered conditions. Historical evidence is a 
tool that is conventionally used by courts in analyzing discrimination 
and Equal Protection claims in order to determine whether 
particular groups should be granted statutory or constitutional 
protection.  For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson,260 which held that 
                                                                                                                                      
323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (affirming conviction of a Japanese American for 
remaining in a military area from which people of Japanese ancestry had been 
excluded).  With respect to age discrimination, see 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000) 
(discussing pervasive exclusion of older employees from the workplace in the 
ADEA’s “Statement of Findings and Purpose” ); Carroll L. Estes, The Aging Enterprise 
Revisited, in CRITICAL GERONTOLOGY:  PERSPECTIVES FROM POLITICAL AND MORAL 
ECONOMY 135-38 (Meredith Minkler & Carroll L. Estes eds., 1998) (discussing social 
perceptions concerning the “problem of age” and discriminatory policies that create 
dependency); Anita Silvers, Aging Fairly:  Feminist and Disability Perspectives on 
Intergenerational Justice in MOTHER TIME:  WOMEN, ETHICS AND AGING 208 (Margaret 
Urban Walker ed., 1999) (“[U]ntil relatively recently . . . the declining capability 
imagined to accompany the biological changes associated with old age . . . mandated 
the exclusion of older individuals from the workplace.”). 
It should be noted that Title VII and the EPA protect anyone who has suffered 
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, or sex, including non-
minorities.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting any wage 
discrimination on the basis of sex); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. 
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682-84 (1983) (ruling that Title VII prohibits discriminatory 
conduct against male employees on the basis of sex); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1976) (analyzing Title VII and holding that Title 
VII prohibits race discrimination against whites).  The origin of these statutes, 
however, is rooted in concern about the disadvantaged status of particular groups, 
and the laws were designed to combat the long history of employment discrimination 
against minorities and women in this country.  John Greenya, Rites of Passage:  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, WASH. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 35 (describing the history of 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 971-74 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing the 
historical background of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, which were instrumental in 
narrowing the gap between men’s and women’s earnings). 
 257. See supra Part I.A (discussing the term). 
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
 259. Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 260. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a statutory preference that 
deemed wives of male military personnel automatic dependents for purposes of 
obtaining greater housing allowances and medical and dental benefits, but denied 
husbands of female members of the armed forces such status unless they in fact 
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classifications based on sex are inherently suspect and subject to 
heightened scrutiny, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here can be 
no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination.  Traditionally, such discrimination was 
rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in 
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage.”261 
Similarly, in Cleburne v. Cleburne,262 a case that found a city’s 
requirement of a special use permit for the establishment of a group 
home for the mentally retarded to violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Marshall argued that “the mentally retarded 
have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation that 
can only be called grotesque.”263  The majority, however, found that 
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification requiring 
heightened scrutiny, although it revoked the special permit 
requirement under a rational basis analysis.264  An added advantage of 
developing scholarship concerning the history of discrimination 
suffered by individuals with disabilities is that it might bolster future 
attempts by disabled plaintiffs to win Fourteenth Amendment cases.  
Greater awareness of past discriminatory practices might convince the 
courts that those with particular disabilities in fact constitute a 
suspect class deserving of heightened scrutiny. 
Within the ADA context, Justice Ginsburg, in her Sutton v. United 
Air Lines concurrence,265 emphasized the ADA’s legislative findings 
that individuals with disabilities are “persons ‘subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political 
powerlessness in our society.’”266  She further observed that persons 
with poor eyesight are not among those who are “politically 
powerless, nor do they coalesce as historical victims of 
discrimination.”267  Consequently, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the 
                                                                                                                                      
depended on their spouses for over half of their support). 
 261. Id. at 684. 
 262. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 263. Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 264. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (stating that the refusal to treat mental 
retardation as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from 
discrimination because any legislation distinguishing between mental retardation 
and those without mental retardation must still be “rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose”).  Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority’s rational basis 
analysis. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(indicating that heightened scrutiny analysis should have been applied in this case). 
 265. 527 U.S. 471, 494 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 266. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995)). 
 267. Id. 
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petitioners’ severe myopia did not serve to qualify them as members 
of the “discrete and insular minority” of individuals with disabilities.268 
Within the civil rights realm, evidence concerning past and present 
patterns of discrimination has long been utilized to determine the 
scope and character of protected discrete and insular minorities.  
Similarly, the ADA should, in following the civil rights model, protect 
individuals who have been subjected to systematic marginalization, as 
evidenced by historical data. 
One should acknowledge that disability discrimination may be 
distinguished from discrimination against other groups on several 
grounds.  First, the adverse effects of disability discrimination do not 
always pass from one generation to another.  Individuals with 
disabilities often have able-bodied children who do not face the same 
kind of marginalization.  Still, disabled parents who are denied 
employment opportunities will not be able to provide well for their 
children, and thus their progeny may be disadvantaged in much the 
same way as are the younger generations of other minority groups.269  
Second, discrimination against individuals with disabilities is 
sometimes the result of an act of omission rather than the 
consequence of an intentionally committed wrong.  People in 
wheelchairs, for example, were unable to gain entry to many public 
places, but this was more often the result of a failure by the 
proprietor, or another individual, to provide wheelchair access as 
opposed to an active prohibition barring disabled individuals from 
participating in mainstream activities.  Nevertheless, discrimination, 
whether by acts of commission or omission, must be redressed. 
Some scholars have suggested an alternative theory, arguing that 
the ADA be redefined to protect those who suffer stigma270 or 
                                                          
 268. Id.  In her opinion, Justice Ginsburg concludes that Congress utilizes the 
phrase “discrete and insular” to denote its objective of limiting ADA coverage “to a 
confined, and historically disadvantaged, class.”  Id. at 494-95. 
 269. See 2000 N.O.D./Harris Survey, supra note 167 (finding that 29% of disabled 
households live in poverty whereas the same is true for only 10% of nondisabled 
households). 
 270. See Korn, supra note 72, at 448 (proposing that the classification of disability 
under the ADA be redefined as “any physical impairment that is associated with 
stigma”).  Korn suggests that a stigma attaches to a disabled person when others 
perceive him or her as “disadvantaged,” irrespective of the degree of success attained 
by such disabled person.  Id. at 447.  See also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, 
Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 436 (2000) (aligning the concept of stigma 
with “systematic disadvantage” and elaborating a theory that “the very social practices 
that attach systematic disadvantage to particular impairments are what create the 
category of people with disabilities”). 
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subordination.271  In a thought-provoking piece, Samuel Bagenstos 
writes the following: 
The statutory “disability” category should embrace those actual, 
past, and perceived impairments that subject people to systematic 
disadvantages in society.  And the concept of stigma should play an 
important evidentiary role.  Impairments that are stigmatized—that 
type people who have them as “abnormal or defective in mind or 
body”—are particularly likely to meet the systematic disadvantage 
standard.272 
This approach overlaps with the “patterns of discrimination” 
approach, but there are several important differences.  The terms 
“stigma,” “subordination,” and “disadvantage” are far more vague 
than the concept of actual discrimination, which requires historical 
research and factual evidence.  Bagenstos does not provide 
definitions for the terms “subordination” and “disadvantage.”  He 
does, however, discuss the concept of stigma at some length.273  
Stigma is a psychological concept that exists in the minds of those 
who negatively perceive people with disabilities.274  Bagenstos refers to 
a definition provided by Erving Goffman, who describes stigma as an 
“‘undesired differentness’ from what society deems to be ‘normal’ or 
expected.”275  According to Goffman, stigmatization occurs “when 
prevailing social practices treat particular ‘undesirable’ traits as 
universally discrediting.”276 
Determining whether a particular characteristic is perceived as 
universally discrediting would require an assessment of people’s 
inner psyche and could not be accurately accomplished by scientific 
or empirical means.  The approach proposed in this Article carries 
the advantage of being centered upon proof of discriminatory 
actions, not attitudes, and actions can be more easily researched and 
documented.  Moreover, the proposal articulated in this Article 
provides a mechanism for establishing a clear list of covered 
conditions or condition categories.  Therefore, this approach, rather 
                                                          
 271. See id. at 401 (urging the courts to adjust their approach to interpreting the 
ADA’s definition of “disability” in light of the fact that disability results in 
subordination). 
 272. Id. at 445 (citation omitted). 
 273. See id. at 436-45 (explaining that stigmatization arises from three “seemingly 
disparate” problems-societal prejudice, stereotyping, and neglect—but arguing that, 
in fact, the three problems are intertwined). 
 274. See id. at 437 n.154 (describing stigma as the “master status” or “the attribute 
that colors the perception of the entire person,” and quoting Lerita M. Coleman, 
Stigma:  An Enigma Demystified, in THE DILEMMA OF DIFFERENCE:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
VIEW OF STIGMA 211, 219 (Stephen C. Ainlay et al. eds., 1986)). 
 275. Id. at 437 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA:  NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF 
SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963)). 
 276. Id. 
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than one focusing on the more intangible concept of stigma, should 
provide better guidance and prove more accessible to employers, 
litigants, and the courts. 
Bagenstos himself recognizes one limitation of the stigma standard.  
At any given time “[a]ttitudes and practices may differ across 
subcultures and economic sectors.”277 Having acknowledged the 
limitation that different social attitudes, subcultures, economics, 
and/or other factors might have with respect to a finding of disability 
status under the stigma approach, Bagenstos clarifies that plaintiffs 
should not have to prove universal stigmatization of their specific 
condition or limitation.278  Plaintiffs should, however, according to 
Bagenstos, demonstrate that they are being deprived of a “significant 
slice” of the opportunities available to them in general society; and 
furthermore, that such deprivation results from sufficiently 
widespread “prejudiced and stereotyped attitudes . . . [and] 
exclusionary practices.”279  Thus, while Bagenstos argues that the 
underlying issue to be proven for purposes of establishing disability 
status is stigma rather than actual discrimination, he relies at least 
partially on a similar body of evidence—specifically, data concerning 
widespread exclusionary practices—to prove membership in the 
protected class. 
4. Effect on the existing protected class 
Admittedly, some individuals, who may currently meet the 
technical definition of a disabled individual, might lose ADA 
protection under the proposed revision because their condition 
would no longer qualify under the new category of “disability”—one 
that is based on a known pattern of discriminatory practices and 
policies.  This might be true, for example, for some people with heart 
disease or high blood pressure.  It might also be true for people with 
very rare diseases, with respect to which little evidence of past or 
current discrimination might exist.280  However, because federal 
courts are ruling in favor of so few plaintiffs,281 these individuals will 
                                                          
 277. Id. at 452. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.  Regarding the level of stigmatization that plaintiffs must prove, Bagenstos 
would require prejudicial and stereotypic attitudes to be “widely enough held” and 
exclusionary practices “widely enough implemented.”  Id. 
 280. Many rare diseases will, however, fit into one of the broader categories of 
disability because they are contagious or cause disfigurement or mental impairment.  
In addition, individuals with rare conditions will retain the ability to petition the 
EEOC for inclusion of the impairment on an updated list and could be successful if 
they present evidence of discrimination suffered by other patients whom they met in 
treatment or support group settings. 
 281. See discussion supra Introduction. 
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be losing little in terms of potential for success in federal court.  They 
will also retain the ability to sue under applicable state laws282 and to 
assert common law causes of action. 
In this country we have chosen to prohibit discrimination only on 
specific grounds.283  Federal law does not forbid discrimination based 
on many categories, such as party affiliation, parental status, sexual 
preference,284 or physical appearance.285  Limiting the protected class 
of individuals with disabilities to those who have been excluded from, 
or marginalized within, mainstream American society would be 
consistent with our general legislative approach of allowing 
governmental meddling with employment decisions only in very 
restricted circumstances.286 
In addition, many of the individuals who could lose their 
“disability” status under the proposed revision might find that their 
employers remain receptive to their requests for relatively 
inexpensive accommodations because many employers may wish to 
avoid potential litigation under the ADA or applicable state law.  
Employers might also desire to show good will through flexibility and 
accommodation to promote high morale and productivity in the 
workplace. 
Moreover, contemporary workers enjoy the benefits of several 
relevant labor laws.  For example, under state workers’ compensation 
statutes, compensation is available to employees for injuries “arising 
                                                          
 282. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.  Many states have adopted 
language that is identical to the ADA’s, and these states may not choose to revise this 
language, even if revisions are made to the federal statute’s definition. 
 283. By contrast, the South African Constitution prohibits governmental 
discrimination based on many more classifications.  S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2 (Bill of 
Rights), § 9(3) (1996).  Specifically, it provides:  “The state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.”  
Id. 
 284. As of 2000, eleven states—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Wisconsin, as well as the District of Columbia, had laws prohibiting workplace 
discrimination based on sexual preference.  Harvey Berkman, Not Many Gays Filing 
Bias Suits, NAT’L L.J., May 22, 2000, at B1, B3. 
 285. See Note, Facial Discrimination:  Extending Handicap Law to Employment 
Discrimination on the Basis of Physical Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 n.2 
(1987) (noting that physically unattractive people in our society face harsh forms of 
discrimination) (citation omitted). 
 286. As one court stated, “[f]ederal courts ‘do not sit as a super-personnel 
department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.  No matter how medieval 
a firm’s practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how 
mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere.  Rather our inquiry is 
limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.’”  
Chapman v. AI Trans., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Elrod v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th  Cir. 1991)). 
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out of and in the course of employment.”287  The Black Lung Benefits 
Act288 provides compensation for American coal miners who develop 
pneumoconiosis associated with work in coal mines.289  Under the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),290 individuals with serious 
health conditions291 can receive up to twelve weeks, annually, of leave 
from work to care for themselves.292  The FMLA establishes that 
employers with fifty or more employees,293 must provide scheduling 
accommodations for seriously ill individuals even if these persons do 
not have “disabilities” for purposes of the ADA.  In 2002, California 
passed its own, more generous version of the FMLA.294  The California 
statute, entitled the Paid Family Care Leave Act,295 applies to all 
employers and provides employees with a right to six weeks of paid 
leave.296 
Arguably, if American society wishes to provide further workplace 
benefits and protections to people with a very broad range of mental 
and physical limitations, it should do so through expansion of labor 
laws, such as the FMLA and workers’ compensation statutes.  The civil 
rights model is an inappropriate avenue for such endeavors, as civil 
                                                          
 287. Matthew B. Duckworth, Comment, The Need for Workers’ Compensation in the 
Age of Telecommuters, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 403, 409 (2001) (citing directly 
the language used by forty-two states and the District of Columbia to define 
“compensable injury” under the various workers’ compensation statutes); see Mark A. 
Rothstein et al., Using Established Medical Criteria to Define Disability:  A Proposal to 
Amend the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 278 (2002) (noting that 
while variations occur in each state’s workers’ compensation system, many similarities 
also exist, such as reimbursement for medical bills and a percentage of lost wages for 
employees suffering from injuries and illnesses “occurr[ing] during the course and 
scope of their employment”).  In addition, over fifty percent of states include in their 
workers’ compensation statutes a “heart and lung” provision, which creates “‘an 
irrebutable [sic] presumption that any cardiovascular or respiratory impairment 
suffered by a firefighter [(and depending on the jurisdiction, police officers and 
other public employees)] is work-related.’”  Id. at 280 (citing Mark A. Rothstein, 
Refusing to Employ Smokers:  Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 940, 952 (1987)). 
 288. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2000). 
 289. Id. § 901(a). 
 290. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). 
 291. See id. § 2611(11) (defining a “serious health condition” as “an illness, injury, 
impairment, or physical or mental condition” that involves either “inpatient” medical 
care or “continuing treatment” by a specified medical service provider). 
 292. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).  When medically necessary, an employee suffering 
from a “serious health condition” may take leave on an intermittent basis.  Id. 
§ 2612(b)(1). 
 293. See id. § 2611(4)(A)(i) (providing that the term “employer” under the FMLA 
refers to any person “engaged in commerce” with fifty or more employees, thus 
applying the provisions of the FMLA to such employers). 
 294. S.B. 1661, 2001-02 Leg., 2001-02 Sess. (Ca. 2002). 
 295. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-3305 (West 2003). 
 296. Id. § 3301(a).  Employers can require employees to use two weeks of paid 
vacation during the leave.  Id. § 3303(g).  The program is fully funded by employee 
contributions to the State Disability Insurance system.  Id. § 3300(f). 
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rights laws are traditionally limited by design to constitute anti-
discrimination mandates that provide corrective justice, protecting 
discrete and insular minorities that have suffered exclusion and 
marginalization.  Those with eyeglasses and high blood pressure 
might, in fact, deserve special treatment or attention, however, this 
should be granted outside of the civil rights context. 
5. Cost savings and judicial sympathy 
The statutory revision this Article proposes is likely to reduce the 
administrative costs of litigation and statutory enforcement.  Given 
clear guidance, competent attorneys will not file suit on behalf of 
plaintiffs whose impairments are not included within the list, and 
courts, in most cases, will easily make determinations concerning 
whether particular plaintiffs are protected by the ADA.297  The 
proposed standard will eliminate many of the suits filed by plaintiffs 
with trivial impairments that now burden court dockets and will 
substantially reduce prolonged litigation over disability status.298  
These reductions should save significant costs for plaintiffs who 
otherwise file futile cases, for employers, and for the taxpaying 
public. 
Because those with impairments that are included within the list 
will be presumed disabled, some cases that are currently filtered out 
through an analysis of disability status will survive this threshold 
inquiry.  For these cases, the efficiency gained through the 
categorical approach to disability determinations might be offset by 
prolonged litigation concerning other issues that now never reach 
the courts because plaintiffs do not survive the disability inquiry.  For 
example, courts might more frequently be called upon to make 
determinations concerning whether the employer acted with 
                                                          
 297. There may still be disputes concerning certain plaintiffs’ conditions that fall 
within the broad categories of impairments, which are necessarily more vague than 
specific illnesses, such as cancer or HIV.  For example, the categories of mental 
impairments and disfiguring conditions due to illness, injury, or medical procedure 
are meant to be very broad and inclusive.  Consequently, employers might challenge 
a plaintiff’s disability status, alleging that she is simply a poor performer rather than 
mentally impaired or that she is physically unattractive rather than disfigured.  It will 
then be up to the plaintiff to prove a diagnosis of a mental ailment or of an illness, 
injury or procedure that caused disfigurement. Furthermore, there may be some 
disputes concerning the accuracy or validity of a plaintiff’s diagnosis.  Nevertheless, 
the disputes concerning disability status should be far less frequent and less 
complicated than those prevalent under the current definition of disability. 
 298. The EEOC will also be spared the task of conducting lengthy investigations to 
determine each charging party’s disability status.  However, its cost-savings in this 
regard will be offset by the need to compose the initial list of covered conditions and 
impairment categories, to review petitions for addition of conditions to the list, and 
to update the list periodically. 
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discriminatory animus, whether the plaintiff was qualified for the job 
in question,299 whether requested accommodations were reasonable,300 
and whether an individual posed a direct threat in the workplace.301 
From a policy standpoint, however, these should be the issues upon 
which the courts center their attention in disability discrimination 
cases.  Rather than focusing the inquiry solely upon the plaintiffs and 
scrutinizing their daily and private life activities in an effort to 
determine whether they are disabled enough, courts should expend 
their energies on analyzing whether discrimination actually occurred. 
The other federal employment discrimination laws provide a 
model for this methodology because they generate little debate over 
protected status.  Title VII and the EPA cover all individuals, because 
everyone has a race, national origin, religion, and sex, as understood 
by these statutes.302  The ADEA protects all individuals who are forty 
years of age and older.303  When one claims discrimination on the 
basis of race, gender, religion, national origin, or age, one needs little 
proof to establish membership in the asserted protected class. 
In addition, employers who know they will likely triumph in 
challenging a plaintiff’s disability status might have little incentive to 
hire individuals with impairments or to conduct dialogues with 
employees concerning their need for reasonable accommodations.  
Employers might risk litigation concerning adverse hiring or 
accommodation decisions, knowing that if challenged, they will likely 
prevail by convincing the court that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
ADA protection.  The proposed revised definition could provide 
more powerful incentives for employers to be receptive to employees 
with disabilities because all those with listed conditions will be 
presumptively covered under the ADA.  It might also encourage 
parties to engage in early, serious settlement discussions to avoid the 
costs and risks of litigating the many complexities of their cases 
beyond the disability status issue. 
                                                          
 299. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting employment discrimination on 
the basis of disability against otherwise qualified individuals). 
 300. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing that prohibited employment 
discrimination includes an employer’s “not making reasonable accommodations to 
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability” unless the employer shows that the reasonable accommodation would in 
fact subject the employer’s business operation to “undue hardship”). 
 301. See id. § 12113(b) (allowing employers to screen out individuals posing a 
“direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”). 
 302. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (2000)(outlawing employment practices that discriminate 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); see also 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)(1) (2000) (prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace). 
 303. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000). 
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To the extent that some believe that the federal judiciary is biased 
against ADA plaintiffs,304 the proposed standard might also foster 
judicial sympathy towards members of the protected class.  No 
definitive study has been conducted concerning the role of judicial 
sympathy in case decisions.  This area is ripe for further research, 
especially with respect to ADA and other civil rights cases, which are 
often emotionally and ideologically charged.  The little evidence that 
does exist, however, suggests that judges’ personal responses to 
plaintiffs factor into their decisions, and thus, consideration of 
judicial sympathy is important.305 
Several informative studies relate to issues other than the ADA.  
Neal Feigenson found that the level of judicial sympathy and desire 
to assist the victim in tort cases is determined to some degree by the 
extent of the victim’s suffering. Furthermore, the greatest 
compassion is felt for those whose accidents occurred under 
exceptional circumstances.306  By extension, it follows that judges 
would be most sympathetic towards those with severe disabilities and 
those with exceptional hardships due to systematic marginalization.  
A study of the courts’ application of the federal sentencing guidelines 
noted that the tendency of judges in particular regions to depart 
downward in cases of drug couriers, female white-collar criminals, 
and firearm offenders, suggests that judges are occasionally motivated 
by their own sympathies and political views, even when sentencing 
convicted criminals.307 
Studies of the influence of various factors on judicial decisions 
found that female circuit court judges tended to vote more frequently 
than their male colleagues in favor of female plaintiffs who brought 
                                                          
 304. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000) (exploring the various hypotheses 
suggested to explain why plaintiffs under the ADA consistently lose in the courts, and 
referring specifically to the “backlash” thesis, which theorizes that “judges are not 
simply confused by the ADA [but] rather, they are resistant to it”).  Diller qualifies 
his remarks about the backlash theory, however, by stating that judicial backlash 
against ADA plaintiffs does not necessarily stem from a “deliberate or intentional 
campaign.”  Id.  Instead, Diller argues that apparent judicial resistance to the ADA 
could have arisen due to a general lack of judicial comprehension of the ADA 
statute, which subsequently would have led to a failure to “accept the premises 
underpinning” the ADA.  Id. 
 305. See supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text. 
 306. See Neal R. Feigenson, Essay, Merciful Damages:  Some Remarks on Forgiveness, 
Mercy and Tort Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1633, 1637-38 (2000); Neal R. Feigenson, 
Sympathy and Legal Judgment:  A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 50 (1997). 
 307. See Michael S. Gelacak et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  
An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 364 (1996) (suggesting 
that judicial sympathy, rather than the presence of atypical or extraordinary factors, 
may be the cause for consistent departures from the federal sentencing guidelines 
for a particular offense in a particular geographic region). 
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Title VII gender discrimination suits.308  This is most likely because 
they were better able to identify with the female plaintiffs.  Similarly, 
one study of courts of appeals cases concluded that black circuit court 
judges were more responsive to employment discrimination claims 
than were their white colleagues.309 
Based on this very limited evidence and the extremely low ADA 
plaintiff win rate,310 it is reasonable to argue that the segment of 
individuals bringing ADA claims apparently fails to win the sympathy 
of the courts and fosters an impression that ADA plaintiffs do not 
deserve governmental protection.311  Some judges have clearly 
articulated their frustration with ADA claims brought by plaintiffs 
whom they consider unworthy. 
In Fussel v. Georgia,312 the court decried the fact that current 
interpretations of the ADA may lead it to become “the greatest 
generator of litigation ever.”313  The court expressed grave concern 
that the statute would not assist its intended beneficiaries, but rather, 
would be distorted by greedy trial attorneys who will force federal 
judges to become “little more than glorified worker’s compensation 
referees.”314 
                                                          
 308. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 20-21 & n.42 (2001) 
(discussing studies showing that female appellate judges are more receptive to 
female plaintiffs claiming gender discrimination suits, but not necessarily to female 
plaintiffs claiming race discrimination)(citing Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges’ 
Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the United States Courts of Appeals, 
1981-1996 (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago) (on file with 
author)).  George notes, however, that “[f]ederal district court studies have 
repeatedly failed to find a gender effect in any issue area, including sex 
discrimination.”  Id. at 21; see also Sue Davis et al., Voting behavior and gender on the U.S. 
courts of appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 130-32 (1993) (analyzing a study concerning 
voting patterns of women circuit court judges in the areas of employment 
discrimination, search and seizure, and obscenity, and finding that “statistically 
significant differences” exist between male and female judges in employment 
discrimination and search and seizure cases). 
 309. See George, supra note 308, at 24 (citing Crowe, supra note 308, at 84).  The 
author notes, however, that other studies discerned no racial differences in the 
judging of employment discrimination cases.  Id. 
 310. See discussion supra Introduction. 
 311. See ‘Judicial Hostility’ Limiting Reach of the ADA:  Decisions Focus on Coverage, 
Panelists Say, 19 Emp. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 59 (July 10, 2002) 
(reporting on the proceedings of the Industrial Relations Research Association’s 
National Policy Forum in which speakers noted that ADA claims face “significant 
judicial hostility”). 
 312. 906 F. Supp. 1561 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
 313. See id. at 1577 (holding that a discharged police officer with a benign 
essential tremor did not have a disability and emphasizing that “Congress, in its 
wildest dreams or wildest nightmares” did not intend “to turn every garden variety 
worker’s compensation claim into a federal case”) (quoting Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 
891 F. Supp. 482, 485 (W.D. Ark. 1994)). 
 314. See id. at 1577 (quoting Pedigo, 891 F. Supp. at 486). 
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In her study, Ruth Colker confirmed that the type of disability 
alleged is a statistically significant factor in determining the outcome 
of ADA cases on appeal.315  Individuals alleging that they suffered 
from diabetes or extremity impairments were more likely to succeed 
than other plaintiffs.316  Colker speculates that the plaintiffs’ cases 
may have “seemed like more sympathetic cases to judges on 
appeal.”317 
The Supreme Court’s ADA decisions further highlight the 
importance of the nature of the disability to the Court’s 
determination.  While most rulings on the definition of disability 
have been adverse to plaintiffs,318 Bragdon v. Abbott,319 which involved a 
plaintiff who was HIV positive,320 is an exception to the general trend.  
Although Ms. Abbott did not suffer any symptoms, the Supreme 
Court strained to characterize her “dread and fatal disease” as a 
disability.321  The opinion acknowledged that HIV does not physically 
prevent a woman from reproducing.322  For example, artificial 
insemination could eliminate the risk of transmission to the woman’s 
partner.323  Further, the Court acknowledged that the risk of 
transmitting the disease to one’s child can be as low as eight percent 
with antiretroviral therapy.324  Nevertheless, the Court categorized Ms. 
                                                          
 315. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 273 (indicating that plaintiffs 
with substance abuse disabilities did not do as well as plaintiffs with extremities 
impairments). 
 316. See id. at n.77  (noting that “[e]xtremities impairments included missing 
limbs or digits; hand, arm, or shoulder impairments and arthritis”).  Colker devised 
separate categories for back impairments and paralysis.  Id.  However, one should 
note that Colker conducted the study before the Court in Sutton ruled that 
mitigating measures, such as effective medication, must be considered in 
determining whether an individual has a disability.  Id.  Because diabetes is often well 
controlled by medication, plaintiffs with diabetes are far less likely to prevail in a 
post-Sutton case.  See, e.g., Berg v. Norand Corp., 169 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that a diabetic employee who could not work a forty to fifty hour week was 
not disabled); Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 23 Fed. Appx. 811 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that an employee’s diabetes did not substantially limit his major life 
activities, and he did not have a disability for purposes of the ADA); Orr v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding similarly). 
 317. Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 273. 
 318. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 184-85 (2002) 
(finding that the plaintiff’s inability to perform repetitive manual task did not fit 
within the definition of disability under the ADA); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 
U.S. 471, 472 (1999) (refusing to find the plaintiffs disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA). 
 319. 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 320. Id. at 628. 
 321. Id. at 641. 
 322. See id. at 641 (noting that HIV does not render conception and childbirth 
impossible but does pose a public health risk). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 640. 
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Abbott’s HIV as a disability that substantially limited her major life 
activity of reproduction.325 
Courts that primarily hear cases involving conditions commonly 
targeted for discrimination, such as deafness or HIV, will likely find 
disability discrimination cases emotionally powerful and will tend to 
rule more readily for plaintiffs on pre-trial motions.326  Further, under 
the proposed standard, the way in which cases are presented will 
become more compelling for the courts.327  Proof of a history of abuse 
and marginalization associated with a particular condition would 
likely elicit a more sympathetic response from the court than that 
which is evoked when the court skeptically analyzes plaintiffs’ levels of 
functionality by focusing on questions such as whether they can 
garden or brush their teeth.328 
B. Other Options Are Inferior to the Proposed Revision 
1. The definition of disability should not be left as is 
An alternative option to the proposed revision is to leave the ADA 
unaltered.  The fact that a small minority of plaintiffs prevail in 
federal courts under Title I of the ADA may not in itself be 
troubling.329  Many individuals may actually benefit from Title I of the 
ADA through cases resolved by settlement.330  Perhaps most cases with 
strong claims settle at an early stage of litigation, and the cases left for 
adjudication are weak cases brought by unreasonable plaintiffs. 
Some commentators argue that poor lawyering, more than any 
other factor, accounts for the unbalanced case outcomes.331  They 
contend that weak advocates fail to consider numerous factors 
necessary to survive summary judgment in ADA cases.332  This 
                                                          
 325. Id. at 641-42. 
 326. See discussion supra Part III.A.4. 
 327. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 328. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 202 (2002) 
(analyzing the inability of the plaintiff to perform manual tasks and refusing to 
recognize her carpal tunnel syndrome as a disability under the ADA). 
 329. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (discussing studies revealing the 
very low win rates of ADA plaintiffs in federal courts). 
 330. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (noting that ADA plaintiffs may be gaining 
significant benefits through settlements). 
 331. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries:  Why Are So 
Many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before 
a Jury?  A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 515 (2000) (arguing that poor 
lawyering skills, rather than restrictive judicial interpretation, is the primary cause for 
the number of ADA summary judgment losses). 
 332. See id. at 574-75 (noting specifically that the problem appears to arise from 
lawyering that fails to account for important regulations and to plan for effectively 
presenting a strong case theory and convincing evidence). 
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argument suggests that the only needed change with respect to ADA 
litigation is that lawyers become better-trained and more skilled in 
crafting ADA claims to win their cases.333 
Leaving the statutory definition unchanged, however, would be 
misguided.  First, the vagueness and other defects of the definition of 
“disability” necessitate revision regardless of case outcome statistics.334  
It is necessary to find an alternative that will not require courts to 
engage in the burdensome and arbitrary task of individually assessing 
each plaintiff’s functionality level.335  The current standard often leads 
to invasive and humiliating inquiries as well as to inconsistent court 
decisions in which the court must find that the plaintiff is both 
sufficiently disabled and qualified for the job in question.336  A 
plaintiff’s disability status should not depend on his or her precise 
level of functioning.337  Instead, a more workable mechanism for 
characterizing disability must be found. 
Second, this writer finds unconvincing the argument that ninety-
five percent of ADA plaintiffs lose in federal court because their cases 
are uniformly weak.338  It remains unclear why plaintiffs would bring 
weaker cases under the ADA than under the other anti-
discrimination statutes.339  Moreover, plaintiffs’ attorneys have a 
strong economic incentive to filter out cases likely to produce no 
financial gain.340  Additionally, because the ADA’s enactment 
occurred in 1990,341 it seems unlikely that the vast majority of 
attorneys taking ADA cases remain inexperienced and unskilled in 
litigating these statutory claims.342 
                                                          
 333. See id. at 576 (explaining that lawyers for ADA plaintiffs must increase their 
knowledge and skills with respect to the ADA to ensure successful private 
enforcement of the ADA). 
 334. See discussion supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the complications created by the 
current vague language of the statute). 
 335. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 146 (stating that individual assessment creates 
difficulties for both the courts and for the attorneys arguing the cases). 
 336. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
 337. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
 338. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 331, at 517 (stating that the majority of 
ADA cases fail because the lawyers have not adequately prepared or presented 
sufficient evidence to support their clients’ cases under the ADA). 
 339. See discussion supra Introduction (comparing plaintiffs’ win rates under the 
ADA to their success rates under other anti-discrimination statutes). 
 340. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 258 n.54 (stating that if 
lawyers frequently do not prevail under the ADA then they will not receive significant 
compensation). 
 341. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000). 
 342. See Colker, Winning and Losing, supra note 4, at 258 n.54 (speculating that 
poor lawyering would self-correct over time and therefore could not be the cause for 
the current legal failures under the ADA). 
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Finally, once it becomes common knowledge that defendants will 
likely prevail in federal court, employers will become increasingly 
reluctant to settle.343  In light of the highly publicized Supreme Court 
decisions of recent years344 and the abundant commentary 
concerning these cases, many employers will realize that ADA 
plaintiffs have a low probability of prevailing in federal courts, which 
may discourage future settlements.345  Assuming that the courts 
remain inclined to find that few individuals meet the “disability” 
criteria,346 the ADA may become even more ineffective as a 
mechanism for redress of employment discrimination. 
2. The scope of the definition should not simply be broadened by eliminating 
the definition’s restrictive terminology 
A second alternative is to revise the definition of disability to 
broaden its scope.  The restrictive terms “substantially limits” and 
“major life activities” contained in the statute could be eliminated,347 
so that the statute would prohibit discrimination against all 
individuals who have a mental or physical impairment, have a record 
of such an impairment, or are perceived as having such an 
impairment.348  The ADA’s new definition could mandate that 
employers cannot make adverse employment decisions based on any 
physical or mental impairment, regardless of the degree to which the 
condition impairs the individual in question, unless the impairment 
renders the person unqualified without possible and reasonable 
accommodation or the person constitutes a direct threat in the 
workplace.349  This approach would eliminate the requirement of 
                                                          
 343. Cf. Tucker, supra note 186, at 353-54 (emphasizing that numerous negative 
judicial decisions have weakened the impact and authority of the ADA). 
 344. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) 
(holding that the plaintiff’s carpel tunnel syndrome did not qualify as a disability 
under the ADA because it did not substantially limit her major life activities); 
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516 (1999)(holding that the plaintiff’s high 
blood pressure did not qualify as a disability under the ADA); Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that myopic twin sisters did not state a claim 
under the ADA because they could not show that they had a physical impairment 
substantially limiting them in any major life activity). 
 345. See Colker, A Windfall for Defendants, supra note 4, at 108 (citing figures 
showing that defendants prevailed in ninety-four percent of ADA cases). 
 346. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 354 (asserting that many courts have attempted 
to narrow the scope of the ADA). 
 347. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining a disability as “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
[an] . . . individual”). 
 348. Feldblum, supra note 81, at 163. 
 349. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5)(A), 12113(b) (2000)(establishing that the 
ADA proscribes the making of adverse employment decisions based on disabilities 
unless a disability renders the person unqualified, and no reasonable 
accommodation is possible or the person will pose a direct threat in the workplace). 
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individualized assessment of each plaintiff’s precise level of 
functionality for purposes of determining disability status.350 
Just as other civil rights laws prohibit consideration of race, 
national origin, religion, sex, and age in employment decisions in 
most instances,351 the ADA could also prohibit consideration of all 
mental and physical impairments unless special circumstances exist.352  
In this sense, broadening the definition of disability would bring the 
ADA closer to the traditional civil rights model, which precludes 
decision-making based on clearly discernible characteristics.353  The 
inclusion of more people within the ADA’s protected class is 
consistent with the other federal anti-discrimination statutes.354  Title 
VII and the EPA apply to all individuals because everyone possesses a 
race, national origin, religion, or sex as those terms are used in these 
statutes.355  The ADEA also applies to a large segment of the American 
                                                          
 350. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the inefficiency of the current 
statute’s method of inquiring into each plaintiff’s daily activities). 
 351. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)(prohibiting consideration of race, national 
origin, religion and sex in employment decisions); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000) 
(prohibiting consideration of age in employment decisions for people forty years of 
age or older); see  also supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions 
to the general rules created by certain statutory defenses). 
 352. For additional articles recommending an expansion of the definition of 
disability, see Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights:  Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, 
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 318 
(2000) (suggesting that the ADA be amended to remove the “substantial limitation in 
a major life activity” language for cases that do not involve a request for 
accommodation); Anderson, supra note 81, at 129, 140 (asserting that the 
“substantially limits” requirement should be eliminated from the ADA and that 
“working” should not be considered as a separate major life activity); Eichhorn, supra 
note 81, at 1473-77 (recommending that the ADA be revised so that it prohibits 
discrimination “on the basis of disability” rather than covering a specific protected 
class, consisting of qualified individuals with disabilities); Miranda Oshige Mcgowan, 
Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 137 (2000) (arguing 
for a broad definition of the “regarded as” prong of disability so that the ADA would 
protect any individual that an employer believes is less qualified for the position as a 
result of generalizations about the individual’s perceived physical or mental 
impairment); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:  Redefining the 
Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 131 
(1997) (suggesting that an individual’s ability to work should not be assessed in 
determining an individual’s disability status); Tucker, supra note 186, at 373 (listing a 
number of possible revisions to the ADA but warning that if Congress revisits the 
ADA, it may reduce, rather than expand, the protections of the statute). 
 353. See Feldblum, supra note 81, at 163 (stating that if the ADA’s definition of 
disability is broadened, the statute will closely mirror Title VII, which provides broad 
protections against discrimination). 
 354. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (applying Title VII to all individuals subjected 
to discrimination by employers because of their national origin, race, religion or 
sex). 
 355. See id. § 2000e-2(a) (establishing that it is unlawful for employers to 
discriminate on the basis of race, national origin, religion or sex); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d)(1) (1998) (prohibiting wage discrimination based on sex, with some 
exceptions). 
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population, since it protects all individuals who are forty years of age 
and older.356 
Title VII, the EPA, and the ADEA, however, rely on the theory that 
minorities and non-minorities can perform work equally well because 
the immutable characteristics addressed in those statutes are 
irrelevant to job performance.357  In general, these statutes only 
prohibit conduct based on irrational prejudice and assumptions.358  
The ADA, by contrast, forbids employers to exclude individuals 
because of mental and physical impairments that potentially affect 
their work performance, and it requires employers to accommodate 
those conditions in ways that may generate significant costs.359  
Expanding the population entitled to ADA protection to the point of 
including most Americans, and thus perhaps dramatically raising 
employers’ compliance expenditures, may adversely impact the 
business community and, by extension, the American workforce.360  It 
might also provide incentives for employers to avoid hiring 
individuals with any known impairment because the risk of unlawful 
hiring decisions may seem smaller than the risk of facing 
accommodation demands from an ever-growing number of 
workers.361 
Furthermore, significantly expanding the scope of the protected 
class might encourage more plaintiffs with trivial impairments to 
assert ADA claims.362  Elimination of the definition’s restrictive 
language will not necessarily promote the statutory goals of 
participatory, distributive, and corrective justice.363  It may not lead to 
increased employment opportunities for those who are actually 
marginalized or to a redistribution of resources to those who are 
most needy and deserving.364 
                                                          
 356. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to 
discriminate on the basis of age against individuals forty years of age or older). 
 357. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text (discussing the various theories 
underlying the civil rights statutes). 
 358. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (analyzing the purpose of the civil rights 
statutes). 
 359. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000); see discussion supra Part I.C.3 (discussing 
potential costs that may be incurred by employers attempting to accommodate 
workers’ physical and mental impairments). 
 360. See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (noting that the current statute requires the 
employers to absorb the cost of providing reasonable accommodations). 
 361. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (examining the financial 
burden on employers complying with ADA requirements). 
 362. See discussion supra Part III.A.5 (discussing the current problem of an 
excessive number of trivial ADA claims crowding court dockets). 
 363. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (discussing the current statutory 
goals of the ADA and emphasizing the importance of obtaining corrective justice for 
disabled individuals). 
 364. See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text (delineating the statutory goals 
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Finally, it is unrealistic to believe that Congress will be inclined to 
dramatically enlarge the class of individuals with disabilities, given the 
general climate of dissatisfaction with the ADA.365  Several 
commentators have noted that criticism of the ADA extends beyond 
the realm of the courts.366  The media’s disparagement of the ADA 
through print, television news, and sitcoms, indicates that the 
American public may not support liberalizing the statutory terms to 
incorporate more individuals.367  As Professor Bonnie Poitras Tucker 
notes, reopening discussions concerning the ADA will likely lead 
Congress to diminish the protections offered by the ADA rather than 
to expand its scope.368 
The proposal this Article offers in some ways broadens the 
contours of the ADA’s protected class.369  Specifically, highly 
functional individuals who are disfigured or epileptic would be 
covered under the proposal even though they are not substantially 
limited in any major life activity.370  However, the proposal also 
narrows the range of protected individuals by excluding any 
condition not associated with a known pattern of discrimination from 
the list, even if the condition is potentially disabling.371  For example, 
conditions such as cardiovascular disease and arthritis are unlikely to 
be covered.372  Consequently, one may reasonably believe that both 
Congress and the public would be receptive to the proposal. 
                                                                                                                                      
of the ADA). 
 365. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 338-39 (noting the country’s failure to embrace 
the ADA’s premises, and the current backlash against the statute). 
 366. See Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung, and Juggler’s Despair, The 
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
223, 227 (2000) (stating that the media is increasingly critical of the ADA and seems 
to focus on allegedly fraudulent cases filed under the statute); see also Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Foreword-Backlash Against the ADA:  Interdisciplinary Perspectives and 
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9-10 (2000) 
(denoting the negative portrayal of the ADA by the media). 
 367. See LaCheen, supra note 366, at 228, 232 (explaining that the popular media 
is conveying the belief that people bringing cases under the ADA are attempting to 
cheat the system, thus encouraging intolerance of the ADA). 
 368. See Tucker, supra note 186, at 388 (asserting that the current political climate 
encourages antagonism towards civil rights statutes and that it would be unwise to 
amend the ADA at this time). 
 369. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the proposal in detail). 
 370. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining the term “disability” as any physical 
or mental impairment that “substantially limits” an individual’s “major life 
activities”). 
 371. See discussion supra Part III.A.4 (explaining that some individuals currently 
covered by the definition of disability may lose this protection under the proposed 
standard). 
 372. See Baldwin, supra note 160, at 44 (suggesting that negative attitudes towards 
persons with impairments vary, depending upon the condition in question, and 
stating that those with arthritis or cardiovascular disease are generally viewed 
positively in American society). 
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3. Funding the unfunded mandate 
A more palatable option might be to eliminate the restrictive 
language of the disability definition as described above and to fund 
the cost of the ADA’s non-discrimination mandate so that it is not 
absorbed by the business community.  This could be done through 
tax credits, tax deductions, or a claims submission process by which 
employers could be reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses.  
Expenditure of additional public dollars in this manner, however, 
does not seem justified at this time. 
The current tax code already makes limited tax deductions 
available for costs associated with ADA compliance.373  Employers who 
hire individuals with mental or physical disabilities can receive a 
maximum credit of $2,400 per qualified employee (forty percent of 
the individual’s qualified first year wages up to $6,000) for those who 
begin work before December 31, 2003.374  In addition, the tax code 
allows employers to receive credits or deductions for expenses 
associated with tangible personal property, such as special equipment 
or assistive listening devices provided to individuals with disabilities 
pursuant to Title I requirements.375  For example, “eligible small 
businesses” can obtain a credit of up to $5,000 for improvements 
made in order to provide access to persons with disabilities.376 
In spite of this, hiring individuals with disabilities might produce 
costs for which employers do not receive adequate tax relief through 
the above-described provisions.  These costs might include high 
reasonable accommodation expenses, diminished productivity, 
absenteeism, and higher health insurance or workers’ compensation 
expenses.  These costs, however, are very difficult to quantify and 
predict and, therefore, cannot be fully addressed through the tax 
code. 
In addition, the limited evidence that exists concerning reasonable 
accommodations suggests that often they may not require large out-
of-pocket expenditures.377  A number of studies were conducted at 
                                                          
 373. See Ellen D. Cook, Tax Breaks Cut the Cost of Americans with Disabilities Act 
Compliance, 69 PRACTICAL TAX STRATEGIES, Sept. 2002, at 145, 145-52 (detailing tax 
relief available to employers providing reasonable accommodations in order to 
integrate disabled individuals into the work force). 
 374. 26 U.S.C. § 51 (2000). 
 375. Id. §§ 44, 179. 
 376. Id. § 44(a); Cook, supra note 373, at 147. 
 377. See Peter D. Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act:  Part I—Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 902 
(1997) [hereinafter Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions] (analyzing various 
studies and concluding that the average cost for reasonable accommodations was 
minimal and that the changes made benefited employees with disabilities as well as 
employees without disabilities). 
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Sears, Roebuck and Co. from 1978 to 1996 concerning the 
accommodation of individuals with disabilities.378  The studies 
revealed that during the years 1993 to 1996, the average direct cost of 
accommodating such workers was forty-five dollars.379  Studies by the 
Job Accommodation Network (“JAN”) found that over two-thirds of 
effective accommodations cost less than $500.380  A 1990 GAO report 
revealed that fewer than one-quarter of workers with disabilities 
received accommodations.381  The report also stated that when 
accommodations were provided, 51% did not require the employer 
to incur any direct cost, 30% cost less than $500, and only 8% cost 
more than $2000.382  Other commentators have stated that the 
average cost of accommodations for disabled employees who require 
them is $200.383  However, no major studies have been conducted 
since the mid-1990s, and none has addressed the indirect costs of 
accommodations, such as those associated with scheduling 
adjustments, added breaks, or acceptance of reduced productivity.  
Furthermore, the statistics might be skewed in that only one-quarter 
to one-third of individuals with serious disabilities have jobs,384 and 
the reasonable accommodation figures might grow dramatically if 
many more of the disabled were employed. 
                                                          
 378. See Peter D. Blanck, Communicating the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
Transcending Compliance:  1996 Follow-up Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., ANNENBERG 
WASH. PROGRAM REP. at 18 (1996) [hereinafter Blanck, Communicating], cited in 
Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902.  Sears, Roebuck and 
Co. conducted a series of studies analyzing the economic implications of workplace 
accommodations between 1978 and 1996—before and after Title I’s July 26, 1992 
effective date.  Id. 
 379. Id.  As discussed in this section, “direct” costs or expenses are those associated 
with payment for devices, equipment or construction of mechanisms to assist people 
with disabilities.  “Indirect” costs are those generated by scheduling adjustments, 
acceptance of reduced productivity or other accommodations that do not require 
actual payment on the part of the employer.  Id. 
 380. President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities, Job 
Accommodation Network (JAN) U.S. Quarterly Report, Oct.-Dec. 1994, at 14, cited in The 
Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902. 
 381. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:  REPORTS ON 
COSTS OF ACCOMMODATIONS 4, 19 (1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d27t7/ 
140318.pdf. (citing Berkeley Planning Associates, A Study of Accommodations Provided to 
Handicapped Employees by Federal Contractors, 20, 29 (1982)). 
 382. Id. (citing Berkeley Planning Associates at ii, 28). 
 383. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. 
Reg. 8,578, 8,584 (1991) (noting that a “study projecting the impact of the 
‘Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989’ estimated that the average cost of 
accommodations was $200”) (citing Daniel Finnegan et al., The Costs and Benefits 
Associated with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 (1989)). 
 384. See Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 165, at 272 (reporting that the current 
population survey suggests only thirty percent of those with disabilities work); 2000 
N.O.D./Harris Survey, supra note 167 (finding thirty percent as well). 
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Some commentators argue that ADA compliance can actually lead 
to significant cost savings for employers.385  Programs designed to 
enhance workplace safety to accommodate those with disabilities can 
improve the productivity, job tenure, and absenteeism rates of all 
members of the workforce.386  By reducing the number of accidents 
that occur in the workplace, safety programs and devices can 
diminish overall costs associated with job injuries.387  In addition, 
employees with disabilities often have lower turnover rates than able-
bodied workers, and their absenteeism and productivity have been 
found to be equivalent to those of their nondisabled counterparts.388  
Commentators further note that removing more individuals with 
disabilities from the ranks of the unemployed and impoverished 
would reduce welfare expenditures and thus would save significant 
costs for the public at large.389 
The ADA is not unique in imposing financially burdensome 
requirements upon employers.  While one might argue for a general 
diminishment of the public responsibilities placed upon employers, 
concern should not be focused particularly on the ADA.  American 
law imposes countless unfunded mandates on American employers.  
For example, they must pay a minimum wage390 and overtime 
                                                          
 385. See The Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 902 (reporting 
that according to JAN studies, almost two-thirds of accommodations resulted in 
company savings exceeding $5000, which were associated with “lower job training 
costs and insurance claims, increased worker productivity, and reduced 
rehabilitation costs after injury on the job”). 
 386. See id. at 902-05 (recognizing that accommodations involving  advanced 
technology have been shown to produce benefits for employees with and without 
disabilities in terms of increased work productivity, injury prevention, reduced 
workers’ compensation and reduced worker absenteeism). 
 387. See id. at 902 (reporting that, according to JAN, companies realize 
approximately fifty dollars in benefits for every dollar spent on an effective 
accommodation). 
 388. See Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and Workers with Disabilities, 
21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314, 323-26 (2000).  The author reports that according 
to the U.S. Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, ninety-one percent of workers with 
disabilities were rated “average” or “better than average,” while nondisabled 
employees were given approximately equivalent scores.  Id.  In addition, one study 
found “that sixty percent of disabled workers remained with their job placement as 
opposed to only forty percent of able-bodied workers, and that the average cost of 
each job turnover was $2,800.”  See id. at 325 (citing Peter D. Blanck, The Emerging 
Role of the Staffing Industry in the Employment of Persons with Disabilities:  A Case Report on 
Manpower Inc. 7 (Annenberg Washington Program Publication, 1998)). 
 389. See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HR MAG., June 
1998, at 141, 144 (citing Rutgers economist Douglas Kruse).  The article estimates 
that employing one million individuals with disabilities would lead to a “$21.2 billion 
annual increase in earned income; a $1.2 billion dollar decrease in means-tested 
income payments; a $286 million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8 
billion dollar decrease in Supplementary Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer 
people using Medicaid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare.” 
 390. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000). 
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payments for some employees who work more than forty hours a 
week.391  Employers must comply with the environmental and record-
keeping requirements of the Occupational and Safety and Health Act 
(“OSHA”) to ensure a safe working environment,392 and for certain 
medical and family reasons, must allow employees to take unpaid 
leave under the FMLA.393 
One scholar argues that other federal anti-discrimination laws also 
impose significant costs upon employers.394  For example, Title VII 
prohibits employers from refusing to hire a member of a protected 
class because of customer or coworker attitudes about the group in 
question.395  An employer who must hire a woman or a member of an 
ethnic minority in order to comply with Title VII, even though 
customers or other employees will feel uncomfortable working with 
the individual, may suffer financial loss in the form of lost income 
from sales to customers who go elsewhere or reduced productivity on 
the part of distressed employees.396  Likewise, Title VII prohibits an 
employer from utilizing a facially neutral employment practice that 
has a disparate impact on members of a protected class unless the 
employer can demonstrate that the practice is job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.397  Employers who must forego 
their chosen application processes or abandon other favored job 
criteria in order to comply with Title VII absorb the cost of 
substituting other practices that they deem less desirable.398 
Finally, the ADA is quite balanced in that it provides employers 
with several powerful defenses.  The ADA protects only qualified 
individuals with disabilities.399  Employers are not required to consider 
                                                          
 391. Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 392. Id. § 654(a)(2); see id. § 654(a)(1) (mandating that each covered employer 
must keep its workplace “free from recognized hazards . . . causing or . . . likely to 
cause death or serious physical harm to [its] employees”); id. § 657(c) (requiring the 
maintenance of accurate records and the filing of periodic reports concerning 
workplace injuries). 
 393. Id. §§ 2601-2554. 
 394. Jolls, supra note 119 (discussing the financial costs associated with employing 
a disfavored group of employees under different anti-discrimination laws). 
 395. See Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th  Cir. 1981) 
(holding that employers cannot refuse to hire a female applicant because of 
customer preference for contact with a male employee). 
 396. Jolls, supra note 119, at 35. 
 397. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (holding that employers could not use possession of a high 
school diploma and scores on general intelligence tests as requirements for 
successful applicants because these criteria disproportionately eliminated black 
candidates and were not clearly related to job performance). 
 398. See Jolls, supra note 119, at 8-20 (illustrating that the anti-discrimination laws’ 
prohibition of practices with a disparate impact can translate into accommodation 
requirements). 
 399. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). 
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individuals with disabilities who do not have the requisite education 
and experience for the job and need not retain those who have 
demonstrated incompetence or performance problems.400  Employers 
are obligated to provide only accommodations that are “reasonable” 
and are free to refuse to undertake accommodations that will pose an 
“undue hardship” on the operation of their businesses.401  The ADA 
also provides employers with a “direct threat” defense.402  Employers 
are not required to hire or retain qualified individuals with 
disabilities who pose risks to the health or safety of themselves or 
others in the workplace.403  These defenses significantly diminish the 
liability exposure of employers and limit the dollars that they are 
likely to spend for purposes of ADA compliance. 
                                                          
 400. See The Economics of the Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 888 
(explaining that Title I requires employers to consider one’s skills independent of 
the disability, but employers have the right to “determine legitimate essential job 
functions or production requirements”). 
 401. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).  The ADA provides the following details 
concerning the reasonable accommodation requirement: 
Factors to be considered.  In determining whether an accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered 
include— 
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this Act;  
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in 
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons 
employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the 
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the 
facility;  
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size 
of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its 
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and  
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including 
the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such 
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship 
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity. 
Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
Like the definition of “disability,” this standard suffers from vagueness because it 
provides no guidance as to how the four factors are to be balanced or prioritized.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts have found many requested accommodations to 
be unreasonable.  In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 418-20 (2002), for 
example, the Supreme Court ruled that an employer ordinarily does not have to 
provide an accommodation that conflicts with the rules of an established seniority 
system. 
 402. 45 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2000). 
 403. Id.  The plain text of the statute allows for the direct threat defense only in 
cases where an employee with a disability would pose a risk to “other individuals in the 
workplace.”  Id.  (emphasis added).  In 2002, however, the Supreme Court, relying 
on an EEOC regulation, held that employers may also refuse to hire individuals 
whose own health would be endangered if they perform the job duties in question.  
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84-87 (2002).  EEOC regulations 
provide the following guidance:  in determining whether an individual would pose a 
direct threat, the factors to be considered include:  “1) The duration of the risk; 
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; 3) The likelihood that the 
potential harm will occur; and 4) The imminence of the potential harm.”  29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(r) (2002). 
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Further studies should be conducted to determine the full extent 
of the costs and benefits of Title I of the ADA, including expenses 
associated with hiring, retention, and accommodation of disabled 
workers, administrative compliance, and litigation.404  However, 
neither the empirical evidence gathered to date nor a plain reading 
of the statutory text justifies deep anxiety about exorbitant expenses 
absorbed by the business community and not currently addressed 
through tax relief measures. 
4. The definition of disability should not be retained and elucidated   
through extensive impairment-based lists or formulas 
A different alternative for revising the ADA is to retain the current 
definition of disability but to elucidate it by creating an extensive 
impairment-based list or a formula to describe those encompassed 
within the protected class.  Detailed specification would provide 
clearer guidance to the courts, to plaintiffs who must evaluate the 
viability of their claims, and to employers who must comply with the 
statutory obligations. 
There are at least two ways in which the definition could be 
reformulated to achieve greater specificity.  First, the definition could 
be retained but supplemented by a list of conditions that are covered 
by the ADA.  During congressional debates, legislators considered 
specifying the conditions to be covered by the ADA and actually 
created a list of disorders.405  The National Federation of 
Independent Business favored the creation of a list so that employers 
would have precise guidance as to which conditions must be 
accommodated, and it estimated that 900 types of disabilities would 
be included.406  Theoretically, at least, a list would provide definitive 
guidance to employers and the courts, eliminating the need for 
extensive litigation concerning the question of whether or not the 
plaintiff has a disability. 
                                                          
 404. The Economics of The Employment Provisions, supra note 377, at 906-08 (urging 
that additional studies be conducted to examine the direct and indirect costs and 
benefits of Title I implementation, compliance and related litigation in order to 
accurately assess its economic impact). 
 405. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 
(listing a number of conditions that would be covered including orthopedic, visual, 
speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, 
multiple sclerosis, HIV/AIDS, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, 
emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, and drug and alcohol addiction). 
 406. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989:  Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the 
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 
89-90 (1989) (statement of John J. Motley III, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.); see also 136 
CONG. REC. H-2599-01, 2621 (1990) (statement of Rep. McCollum) (estimating that 
approximately 900 disabilities could be covered by the ADA). 
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Use of a list to define the protected class would not be an 
unprecedented practice.  In the field of employment law, lists are 
already utilized in several contexts.  Workers’ compensation laws in 
this country rely on lists of impairments.407  These laws, which vary 
from state to state, provide for coverage of medical costs and a 
percentage of lost earnings for employees whose injuries or illnesses 
occur within the course and scope of employment.408  Benefits are 
scheduled and listed by the extent of injury.  For example, benefits 
are awarded for a varying number of weeks for loss of an arm, hand, 
thumb, first finger, second finger, third finger, fourth finger, leg, 
foot, great toe, other toes, one eye, hearing in one ear, and hearing 
in both ears.409 
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has also created a list of 
impairments for purposes of administering claims for Social Security 
Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits.410  The listing of impairments, 
which is periodically amended and updated,411 spans eighty-five pages 
in the Code of Federal Regulations, and includes numerous 
categories, such as the musculoskeletal, respiratory, cardiovascular, 
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, endocrine, multiple 
body, and immune systems; special senses and speech; neurological; 
skin; mental disorders; neoplastic diseases and malignancies.412  In 
part, the SSA asks each benefits applicant whether her impairment is 
identical or equal to an impairment on the list.413  However, fulfilling 
this criterion accounts for only sixty percent of all awards.  Those who 
do not have a listed condition may prove that they, nevertheless, are 
unable to “perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 
national economy.”414  Allowing applicants who do not have a listed 
condition to receive benefits if they can prove that their ailments are 
                                                          
 407. See ARTHUR LAWSON, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 62.10 (1984) 
(illustrating the variation of benefits available depending on the type of 
impairment). 
 408. See id. § 1.10 (noting that an employee is automatically entitled to benefits if 
injured in the course of employment). 
 409. See id. § 52.10 (providing a chart of disabilities and corresponding benefits). 
 410. See Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1 
(providing list of impairments); see also Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 
795, 804 (1999) (describing the Administration’s handling of disability claims); see 
generally 46 AM. JUR. 2D Extent of Disability under Social Security Act § 7 (2002) (exploring 
the process used to determine whether to grant social security benefits to an 
allegedly disabled individual). 
 411. 20 C.F.R. § 404(p), App. 1 (2002). 
 412. Id. 
 413. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 404.1526 (2001) (discussing the listing of 
impairments’ purpose and use as well as the concept of “medical equivalence”); see 
Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804 (noting that one step in the SSA’s analysis is determining 
whether the applicant has an impairment included on the list). 
 414. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 804; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c) (2001). 
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“equivalent” to a listed impairment further complicates the process 
and reduces its efficiency.415  Finally, in Cleveland v. Policy Management 
Systems Corp.,416 the Supreme Court recognized that the SSA’s list 
would be inappropriate for ADA purposes because it over-simplifies 
many complicated conditions, failing to take into account individual 
differences that might render people able to perform specific jobs 
with or without reasonable accommodations.417  Thus, a different, 
more nuanced list would thus be necessary for ADA determinations. 
Mark Rothstein and his colleagues propose the creation of such a 
list in a recently published article.418  They suggest that the definition 
of “disability” be left intact, but that Congress should direct the 
EEOC “to publish medical standards for determining disability for 
the most common physical and mental impairments” so that “[a]n 
individual whose medical condition met the published criteria would 
be presumptively covered under the ADA.”419  The authors 
themselves, however, recognize the complexities and limitations of 
their proposal.  They acknowledge that no list can be exclusive and 
include all medical conditions.420  Furthermore, impairments affect 
various individuals to different degrees, and consequently, an 
individualized assessment of the degree of impairment would still be 
necessary.421  A further obstacle arises from the fact that a moderate 
condition can become substantially limiting if it coexists with another 
moderate condition.422  Consequently, individuals whose conditions 
do not meet the published criteria would not be barred from 
bringing suit.  Rather, they would have to rebut the presumption of 
non-coverage by providing clear and convincing evidence that their 
impairments substantially limit a major life activity.423 
Creating an exhaustive list of physical and mental conditions to be 
covered by the ADA would, in fact, be nearly impossible.424  No list 
that attempts to capture all disabling conditions could be fully 
                                                          
 415. See Floyd Skloot, A Measure of Acceptance, 19 CREATIVE NONFICTION 79, 79-91 
(2002) (describing the lengthy and demeaning process of testing that the mentally 
disabled author was required to undergo when the Social Security Administration 
decided to re-evaluate his disability status eight years after its initial determination in 
his case). 
 416. 526 U.S. 795 (1999). 
 417. Id. at 803-04. 
 418. Rothstein, supra note 287, at 270-72. 
 419. Id. at 270-71. 
 420. Id. at 271. 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 27 (1990) (asserting that such a list would 
not ensure comprehensiveness, particularly because new disorders could develop in 
the future). 
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accurate and comprehensive.  The objections identified by Professor 
Rothstein are all appropriate.425  In addition, medical science 
perpetually achieves advances in disease identification and treatment, 
so that one’s disability status associated with particular conditions 
might change over time. 
While creation of a non-exclusive list of covered conditions will 
partially fill the vacuum of guidance that now exists, it is unlikely to 
dramatically reduce litigation concerning the question of what 
constitutes a disability.  Individuals with conditions that are not 
specifically listed would bring suit claiming that their impairments 
are, nonetheless, substantially limiting and, thus, covered under the 
ADA.  The courts would then be required to make those disability 
determinations.  The proposal, therefore, would not eliminate the 
problems of inconsistent court decisions, invasive scrutiny of private 
activities, and the Catch-22 related to proving that an individual is 
both substantially limited and still qualified for the job in question.426  
It is for these reasons that the recommendations outlined in this 
Article offer a superior alternative.  An exclusive list of impairments 
and impairment categories, based not on the extent to which they 
affect daily living, but on evidence of systematic discrimination 
against those with the covered conditions, would address the 
concerns described above and provide much clearer guidance to 
litigants and the courts.427 
A second approach is one that has been adopted by some 
European countries.428  These countries provide special benefits and 
rights to individuals who have a specific degree of disability.  In 
Germany, for example, the determination of disability status is made 
by an independent welfare institution, and the “severely disabled” are 
defined as those with at least a fifty percent degree of disability.429  In 
the Netherlands, there are seven categories of disability, determined 
                                                          
 425. See supra notes 420-23 and accompanying text (noting the problems with the 
author’s own suggestion to create a list of disabilities to be covered by the ADA). 
 426. See discussion supra Part I.C.2 (exploring problems raised by the 
individualized assessment approach). 
 427. See discussion supra Part III.A (arguing that the ADA should be amended to 
redefine individuals with disabilities as those with mental or physical impairments 
that have been subjected to a pattern of discrimination and by creating specific 
categories of covered impairments). 
 428. Patricia Thornton & Neil Lunt, Employment Policies for Disabled People in 
Eighteen Countries:  A Review, University of York Printing Unit, available at 
http://gladnet.org/infobase/employment/Policies/emp_policies_18_countries.htm 
(describing the disability laws of various countries) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 429. Id. 
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by the extent to which one’s earning capacity is diminished.430  The 
categories range from fifteen to one-hundred percent.431 
Like an exhaustive list of disabilities, agency determinations of 
disability status based on a required percentage of limitation could 
theoretically provide clear guidance to the courts and diminish the 
volume of frivolous ADA litigation.  So long as an individual obtained 
the necessary documentation proving that the disability was of a 
requisite degree, the courts would be bound to deem the individual 
disabled.  The courts would be spared the task of grappling with the 
question of who is disabled and would not be faced with trivial cases 
brought by plaintiffs who have minor impairments. 
Nevertheless, associating disability status with a percentage of 
incapacity would not be an ideal approach in the United States.  
Determining the precise percentage of disability that would count for 
ADA purposes would be a political nightmare for policy makers 
facing conflicting and passionate demands from a variety of interest 
groups.  It is likely that there would be great resistance to the 
establishment of a single, inflexible bright-line to demarcate who is 
included within the protected class, excluding from protected status 
all who fall even slightly below the required percentage point.  No 
matter what figure is chosen, it would be viewed as arbitrary and 
unjust by many opponents.  Furthermore, once the standard is 
determined, a costly bureaucracy would have to be established to 
conduct medical examinations or review medical records for each 
claimant in order to ascertain whether the requisite percentage of 
disability exists. 
While it may seem as though the process of determining each 
person’s degree of limitation would be exact and scientific, it is 
unlikely to be so, especially with respect to mental disabilities.  
Procedures for testing and evaluation could be lengthy and 
controversial, causing delays in the resolution of cases.432  
Furthermore, it is probable that disability determinations would be 
frequently challenged as inaccurate, biased, or unreliable and, 
therefore, would spawn significant litigation.  Consequently, adopting 
a percentage-based disability definition is unlikely to be an efficient, 
just, and greatly improved mechanism for determining who is an 
individual with a disability. 
                                                          
 430. Id. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Skloot, supra note 415, at 79-91. 
HOFFMAN.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 10/28/2003  2:10 PM 
2003] CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND TITLE I OF THE ADA 1287 
CONCLUSION 
The introductory “Findings and Purposes” section of the ADA 
asserts that the statute aims to present an unambiguous and 
comprehensive national directive for the eradication “of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities”433 and thus to 
promote corrective justice.  More specifically, the statute’s aim is to 
provide its protected class with an equal opportunity to fully 
participate in society, live independently, and become economically 
self-sufficient434 because individuals with disabilities have faced a 
history of intentional discrimination and have been “relegated to a 
position of political powerlessness in our society.”435  At this time it is 
very difficult to assess the efficacy of Title I of the ADA conclusively in 
light of the dearth of available empirical information.436  The limited 
evidence that exists, however, suggests that these objectives are not 
being adequately fulfilled.437  Moreover, a plain reading of the 
statutory text reveals that the definitional language of the ADA is 
severely flawed and requires amendment.438 
It is arguable that no change in the ADA’s definition of disability 
will enhance the law’s efficacy.  As some have noted, in “the current 
political climate . . . there is great dissatisfaction with civil rights laws 
in general.”439  Recently, the Supreme Court has eroded the relief 
available to ADA plaintiffs in decisions concerning reasonable 
accommodations,440 the direct threat defense,441 the ability of plaintiffs 
to sue state employers,442 and the availability of punitive damages.443 
                                                          
 433. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1995). 
 434. Id. § 12101(a)(8). 
 435. Id. § 12101(a)(7). 
 436. See discussion supra Part II (noting the limited availability of empirical 
evidence and the inconclusiveness of much of that data). 
 437. See discussion supra Part II (discussing evidence concerning employment 
rates of individuals with disabilities and relief obtained by victims of discrimination). 
 438. See discussion supra Part I (analyzing the ambiguity the definition of 
“disability”). 
 439. Tucker, supra note 186, at 373; see Michael Selmi, Why are Employment 
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2001) (discussing 
judicial hostility towards plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases). 
 440. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that if an 
employer proves that a desired accommodation conflicts with an established seniority 
system, the employer is not required to provide the accommodation unless special 
circumstances exist). 
 441. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (ruling that 
employers are authorized to refuse to hire an individual whose own health would be 
endangered by performance of job duties even if no direct threat is posed to anyone 
else in the workplace). 
 442. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding 
that private parties could not sue state employers for money damages under the ADA 
because of Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
 443. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (finding that punitive damages may 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has issued several opinions that have 
limited the right of action available to employment discrimination 
plaintiffs in areas other than the ADA.444  It is possible, consequently, 
that even if Congress amended the statute, the courts would continue 
to narrow the scope of ADA protection regardless of any changes in 
the statutory definition. 
Nevertheless, amending the disability definition and establishing 
an exclusive list of covered impairments and condition categories 
associated with systematic discrimination would offer both fidelity to 
the statutory goal of corrective justice and workability as a legal 
instrument.  It would promote inclusion of those who have been 
traditionally excluded and redistribution of resources to the most 
needy and deserving. It would provide more lucid guidance to 
plaintiffs who must decide whether they have viable discrimination 
claims, to employers who wish to avoid violations of the law and 
potential litigation, and to the courts.  The new definition of 
disability would replace subjective assessment of the plaintiff’s 
functionality level with a much more concrete and accessible proof 
mechanism. 
As Congress explicitly recognized, strong judicial enforcement of 
the rights of those who are otherwise marginalized would also benefit 
the American economy.445  The statute’s Findings section decries the 
spending of “billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting 
from dependency and nonproductivity.”446  If individuals with 
disabilities who have traditionally been excluded from the workplace 
knew they had strong advocates in the courts and could obtain 
meaningful relief if they faced discrimination, more might attempt to 
enter and remain in the workforce.447  At the same time, if employers 
                                                                                                                                      
not be awarded in private suits brought against public entities under section 202 of 
the ADA). 
 444. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (ruling that the ADEA 
did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity and, therefore, private 
parties could not bring ADEA suits against state employers); see also Circuit City v. 
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (holding that mandatory arbitration policies unilaterally 
imposed by employers on employees could be enforced under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, with the very narrow exception of policies that applied to 
transportation workers).  Under Circuit City, those whose employers have 
implemented mandatory arbitration policies cannot bring their employment 
discrimination cases to federal court even if they were given no meaningful choice 
concerning acceptance of the policy.  Id. 
 445. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1995). 
 446. Id. 
 447. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 16-17 (1989) (noting that “discrimination results in 
dependency on social welfare programs that costs the taxpayers unnecessary billions 
of dollars each year”); 135 CONG. REC. S10713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of 
Sen. Harkin) (stating that President Bush estimates that national spending on 
disability benefits and programs equals sixty billion dollars, money that will be saved 
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did not incur costs associated with disputes involving the many 
people whose impairments would not be listed as disabilities, they 
might be more willing to invest voluntarily in integrating individuals 
with disabilities into the workforce.  It is only with a better conception 
of who constitutes an individual with a disability that the ADA will 
fulfill its mission of providing “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards”448 and meaningful legal remedies for those subjected to 
disability discrimination. 
                                                                                                                                      
once the disabled are employed and become taxpayers and consumers). 
 448. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1995). 
